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ABSTRACT
COMPUTER FORENSICS METHODOLOGY AND PRAXIS
Robin C. Morrison
28 July 2006
This thesis lays the groundwork for creation of a
graduate-level computer forensics course.

It begins with

an introduction explaining how computing has invaded modern
life and explains what computer forensics is and its
necessity.

The thesis then argues why universities need to

be at the forefront of educating students in the science of
computer forensics as opposed to proprietary education
courses and the benefits to law enforcement agencies of
having a computer scientist perform forensic analyses. It
continues to detail what computer forensics is and is not.
The thesis then addresses legal issues and the motivation
for the topic.

Following this section is a review of

current literature pertaining to the topic.

The last half

of the thesis lays a groundwork for design of a computer
forensics course at the graduate level by detailing a
methodology to implement which contains associated
laboratory praxis for the students to follow.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Computing in Modern Life
Computers have permeated almost every aspect of modern
life.

Their benefits are innumerable.

Computers have

automated manufacturing processes, sped delivery of goods,
enhanced shopping options, made cross-planetary
communications virtually instant, and even saved lives
through online sharing of medical information.

Information

is much more easily accessible than in the not-so-distant
past and has reduced research time and travel immensely.
However, with the rise in the benefits of computing has
come the rise of the darker side of computing.

In Taoist

philosophy, this would be represented by the yin-yang
symbol.
Unfortunately, criminals have benefited from
technological advancements in computing.

Computers have

made it much easier to steal trade secrets from companies
and have even caused grave threats to national security.
Since global communications are controlled by computers,
they can also be disrupted by computers.
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Law Enforcement

has a much more difficult time catching illegal bookmakers
because in the past, the bookmakers would have volumes of
paper with clients and bets, but now this information can
easily be stored and hidden on removable media.

Organized

crime does not have to keep large accounting registries of
their activities.

They merely need an electronic

spreadsheet and relational databases.

In fact, one of the

fastest growing crimes, identity theft, was not nearly as
common before the advent of the Internet boom of the mid1990s.

For as long as there will be computers, there will

be people and organizations that use them in criminal
activities.
Computers can also be used in civil disputes.

A woman

divorcing her husband for his infidelities may have proof
of his relationships from their home computer.

A company

being sued for wrongful termination by a former employee
may base their defense on the employee's misuse of their
computer systems.

A person being sued by the Recording

Industry Association of America (R.I.A.A.) may be able to
verify his or her claims of innocence by the information
stored on their computer.
There is a common thread binding these scenarios
together:

the ability to extract digital information from

computer media and the ability to present it in a useful
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form in a court of law.

This method of investigation is

known as computer forensics.
Why Computer Forensics?
Is computer forensics a necessary field in the
Information Age?

Although not a focal point of the overall

reporting, several high profile news stories this decade
have shown computer forensics to have played a major part
in investigations.

A woman by the name of Chondra Levy,

who was an intern for California Congressman Gary Condit,
disappeared seemingly without a trace.

In the year 2000,

the police forensically examined the information stored on
her computer.

From the information gained, they were led

to search a local park near her home where they found her
remains.
In 2001, the Enron scandal broke.

By forensically

analyzing computers owned by the corporation, federal
investigators were able to assess the large scope of the
crimes committed by the leaders of the company and secure
many convictions.

In conjunction with the criminal

investigation of the activities at Enron, many civil
lawsuits against the corporation have begun.
In December 2004, a Kansas woman brutally murdered a
Missouri woman, cutting her unborn baby out of her body and
taking the living child with her.
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Law Enforcement

forensically analyzed the computers of both victim and
perpetrator and concluded that they had known each other
and that this escalated from a case of a random act of
violence into a case of premeditated murder.

Without a

doubt, computer forensics has proven itself to be a vital
discipline in these cases.

In addition to these very

dramatic examples, there are many more lower profile cases
on a daily basis that warrant the use of computer forensics
in their investigations.
Why Lab-Based Instruction in Computer Forensics?
Why is there a need for lab-based computer forensics
training?

I have spent the last six years of my life

teaching various aspects of computing at a proprietary
technical college.

I have learned from experience, and

many studies support my claim, that the best way to learn a
computing skill is hands-on training in a laboratory
environment.

Unfortunately, most major colleges and

universities do not actively support this model.

The

traditional classroom teaching found there, in my opinion,
only gives students a theoretical, surface knowledge of the
information being conveyed.

It is then up to the students

themselves, if interested, to conduct experiments relating
to the topics from the classroom.

Unfortunately, without

adequate methodologies, supervision, and equipment these
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experiments could lead students to form false assumptions
and conclusions.
In my experience as an instructor, I have experimented
with many different teaching methodologies.

By mixing and

matching different techniques, I have settled on a
methodology that seems to benefit the most types of
students, addressing a variety of learning styles.
heavily involves laboratory-based curricula.

It

Over 80% of

the teaching and learning is done in a laboratory
environment.

The other 20% of learning is done in

traditional theory sessions alternating between Microsoft
Power-Point style slide shows, video presentations, and the
traditional writing board.
In the laboratory environment, approximately 60% of the
learning is accomplished through instructor-led, hands-on
learning and experimentation.

Approximately 20% of the

learning is done with guided experiments showing the
students step-by-step how to accomplish the learning
objectives set before them.

The final 20% is

experimentation in which the student is required to apply
the skills already learned with minimal guidance from the
instructor.
Since computer forensics is an extremely hands-on and
intensive discipline, I believe the most effective method
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of learning will be the aforementioned method.
staunch proponent of learning-by-doing.

I am a

A student cannot

master a skill by only theoretically learning about the
topic.

They must be able to apply this knowledge, be able

to apply it correctly, and base effective conclusions on
their solid methodology.
Why Graduate Level University Instruction?
Training in computer forensics usually occurs in two
areas:

Law Enforcement and proprietary training.

Law

Enforcement personnel can receive their training at low or
no cost through the National White Collar Crime Commission
(NW3C).

Training for Law Enforcement can also be received

from New Technologies International (NTI) for a fee.

For

the average civilian, the training can be provided, for a
large fee, by companies that focus on computer forensics.
Digital Intelligence, Guidance Software, Paraben, ForensicComputers, and NTI are some of the companies that provide
such training.
Unfortunately, the average college student who has
decided to focus his or her graduate studies on Information
Security cannot afford these expensive training courses.
Therefore, training needs to be given at the graduate level
in a non-proprietary format to equip students with the
necessary investigative skills to ensure competence in the
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field upon graduation.

It should allow for easy transition

into the corporate world with possibly a junior position in
a consulting firm or maybe an entry-level learning position
in a major company with its own forensics department.
The university would be an ideal place to train
students in the art and science of computer forensics.
Unlike proprietary courses, which generally last only three
to five days, usually eight hours per day, the courses at
the university can last up to fifteen weeks with up to
three hours of classroom learning spread over two or three
days per week.

There is less of a time crunch for students

to learn at the university and more time for
experimentation.

Also, the university can provide much

more lab time outside of the classroom for students to
learn, whereas proprietary training usually does not allow
for out of class learning at their facilities.

I have

personally attended a proprietary training course and
although it was very good, I could have learned more indepth if I had been allowed to experiment and learn from
hands-on practice outside of normal training hours.

This

is an area in which university training could excel with
more attention paid to this matter.
I believe computer forensics training should be
reserved for the graduate level only.
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During undergraduate

studies, students are supposed to experience an abundance
of Computer Science or Information Technology fields.

This

is to allow the students to determine if they want to
continue their studies in graduate school with focus on one
field of specialty.

I believe computer forensics to be too

narrow of a field to be offered in the vast array of
baccalaureate courses.

This discipline is highly

specialized and would be valid in an overall Information
Security focus in graduate studies.

I prefer an

undergraduate level course in Information/Computer Security
that may briefly expose students to computer forensics, but
not a specialized course at that level.
My major reason for championing university training is
to put more computer forensic analysts in the field with
backgrounds in computing.

In my discussions with high-

ranking employees of firms providing the proprietary
training, I have been informed that most of the people
attending these training courses are from backgrounds in
law enforcement or are currently law enforcement officers.
In the course I attended, I was the only student not
currently serving in a law enforcement capacity.
The problem I see with this is that most of the
forensic analysis of computers is not being done by those
who have intimate knowledge of computing systems.
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Unless

these people have studied computer science, I do not
believe their knowledge is complete enough to perform
thorough forensic analysis.

Simple anomalies in a system

under analysis that may go undetected by the law
enforcement officer could possibly be easily detected by
the Computer Science trained investigator.
my words.

Do not mistake

I fully believe most computer forensic analysts

in law enforcement do an excellent job.

But, I am of the

opinion that someone whose background is in Computer
Science or Information Technology would make a better
analyst.

I believe that taking someone whose background is

in computing and teaching them the principles of
investigation from a law enforcement perspective is easier
and more beneficial than taking someone whose background is
law enforcement and teaching them computing sciences.
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CHAPTER II
EXPLANATION OF TOPIC
What is Computer Forensics?
The term "computer forensics" was coined in 1991 in the
first training session held by the International
Association of Computer Specialists (IACIS) in Portland,
Oregon [Marcella et al., 317].

Computer forensics is the

science of acquiring, retrieving, preserving, and
presenting data that has been processed electronically and
stored on computer media [Schweitzer, 2].

It is "about

evidence from computers that is sufficiently reliable to
stand up in court and be convincing" [Vacca, 3].
History of Computer Forensics - Historical Computer Crime
To examine the history of computer forensics, we must
first examine the history of computer crime.

The art of

"phreaking", that is exploring the international telephone
systems and stealing service, is said to have originated at
the University of California at Berkeley in the early
1970s.

John T. Draper earned the moniker "Captain Crunch"

when he found out that a toy whistle given away in a box of
the cereal produced a 2600 Hertz tone.
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This is the exact

same tone that AT&T mechanical telephone switching systems
used at that time.

He had previously learned that by

producing that tone into a phone receiver, he could fool
the mechanical computers controlling the lines into
believing the request for service was valid, thus allowing
him to receive free, albeit stolen, long distance service.
This led to creation of "blue boxes" which reproduced the
2600 Hertz tone allowing the user to steal long distance
service from AT&T.

To defeat these devices, phone

companies improved their computer systems.

But, the

improvement of telephone computer systems has led to new
phreaking techniques and tools, such as green boxes, agua
boxes, and mauve boxes.

Although a phreaker does not

directly access the telephone companies' computers, their
actions fall under the categories of telecommunications and
computer crimes.
One of the first publicized cases of computer crime
also did not directly involve computers.

In 1978, Stanley

Mark Rifkin defrauded Security Pacific National Bank of
US$10,200,000 by using a common technique known as social
engineering.

The funds were computer transferred to a

Swiss bank account, thus creating one of the earliest cases
of computer fraud.

His caper eventually made it into the

pages of the Guinness Book of World Records in the category
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of "biggest computer fraud" [Mitnick & Simon, 6].
Probably the first major event that would show the
world the potential of direct computer crimes occurred in
1986.

Marjie T. Britz describes what happened in her book

Computer Forensics and Cyber Crime:

An Introduction.

...an accounting error of less than one
dollar was investigated by a dedicated
employee at the University of California
at Berkeley. This internal
investigation revealed that a German
hacker in the employ of the KGB had
tapped into a military database and
obtained sensitive (but not classified)
information. Using only a personal
computer and a basic modem, this
individual was able to connect to
Berkeley computers via an independent
data carrier (i.e., Tymnet). Once
connected, the hacker was able to move
about the MILNET system with remarkable
ease and relative impunity. The fact
that such vulnerability existed within
data systems was especially
disconcerting to administrators because
of its almost accidental discovery...his
findings resulted in the recognition of
information risks associated with open
systems [Britz, 34].
The entire account of this story has been written by
the man directly involved in this game of cloak and dagger.
Clifford Stoll's book “The Cuckoo's Egg” is a recommended
book on the reading list for those wishing to pursue the
International Information Systems Forensics Association's
Certified Information Forensics Investigator (IISFA CIFI)
certification.
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In 1988, Robert Morris, a graduate student at Cornell
University, rocked the computing world by releasing the
first Internet worm.

By making use of a vulnerability in

UNIX, his worm successfully staged a buffer overflow attack
to crash computers world-wide.

The dubbed "Morris worm"

"crippled over 6,000 computers and caused between $5 and
$100 million in damages" [Britz, 35].
not sound like many computers.

Six thousand does

But in 1988, this was

approximately ten percent of all computers on the Internet.
When viewed in this context, one can see the impact that
the "Morris worm" had.

For his crimes, Morris was

convicted of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1030.

Although he did not serve prison time,

Morris was sentenced to probation and community service,
and he had to pay hefty fines.
Law Enforcement Strikes Back
In the mid- to late-1980s, Law Enforcement and
military agencies decided that computer and computer-based
crime was beginning to exert a negative influence upon
computing and aspects of business and finance.

These

agencies wanted to be able to pool their resources to be
able to combat these new crimes that were becoming more
commonplace.

They needed to merge investigative skills

honed over centuries with rapidly emerging and changing
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technology.
One of the first groups formed to combat computer crime
was the High Technology Crime Investigation Association.
In 1984, several members of the Santa Clara County
Industrial Security Manager's Group, including John
O'Loughlin (now retired but security manager at Intel at
that time and later Sun Microsystems) and Pete Kostner,
security manager at AMD, approached Santa Clara County
District Attorney Leo Himmelsbach to discuss the need for
having law enforcement officers trained in the field of
high technology crime.

Leo Himmelsbach then applied to the

State of California and received a grant from the Office of
Criminal Justice Planning Project approved by the Calif
State Assembly, State Assembly Bill 1078 passed into law
August 31, 1984, Penal Code Section 13970 called " SANTA
CLARA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY CRIME
PREVENTION PROGRAM” [Smith].

Today it has grown into an

international organization of law enforcement agencies,
attorneys, and management level and senior staff security
professionals (read CIO or CISO) that “is designed to
encourage, promote, aid and effect the voluntary
interchange of data, information, experience, ideas and
knowledge about methods, processes, and techniques relating
to investigations and security in advanced technologies
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among its membership” [HTCIA].
It was around this time (1984) that the FBI was
beginning to sit up and take notice of computer crimes.

To

properly address the growing demands of investigators and
prosecutors in a structured and programmatic manner, the
FBI established the Computer Analysis and Response Team
(CART) and charged it with the responsibility for computer
analysis [FBI].
In 1990, the International Association of Computer
Investigative Specialists was “formed to provide training
to law enforcement personnel regarding computer forensics
and high technology crime” [IACIS].

This organization is

committed to promoting training and sharing of techniques
and information between law enforcement agencies.
In 1993, the first International Conference on
Computer Evidence was hosted by the FBI in which many law
enforcement agencies worldwide attended.

It was such a

success that it eventually led to the 1995 formation of the
International Organization on Computer Evidence.

The IOCE

was tasked with creating a uniform standard to be followed
worldwide concerning digital evidence in 1998.

The

reasoning behind this was to ensure that evidence would be
gathered in a like manner internationally and that it would
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be acceptable in courts regardless of their jurisdiction.
The first findings were released for review in 2000 and are
being reevaluated and updated as necessary on a regular
basis.
Although law enforcement agencies are banding together
and attempting to stay ahead of the curve when dealing with
modern computer crime, they need the help of civilian
computer experts trained in computer forensics.

Rapidly

changing and modern forms of computer crime is one major
reason why.
Modern Computer Forensics - Modern Computer Crime
Modern computer crime can usually be divided into two
categories:

computer crime and computer-based crime.

Computer crimes are crimes committed against computer
systems.

Computer-based crimes are crimes in which a

computer was involved in the commission of the crime.
Computer crimes have drastically evolved from their
reported 1986 origins.

Worms, viruses, and Trojan horses

have become more sophisticated as the computer systems on
which they are launched have evolved.

Melissa, I Love You,

Code Red, Nimda, Blaster, and other malware caused ripples
of concern in the major computing circles and widespread
panic in the home-based PC market.

Propagation of Trojan

horses such as SubSeven and BackOrifice have compromised
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many systems such as those of the Apache Foundation,
creator of the most widely-used httpd server.

With the

rise of the popularity of the World Wide Web has come the
hacking and defacing of web sites.

One of the more notable

incidents was the defacing of the website of the New York
Times by the gray-hat hacker Adrian Lamo.

Finally, theft

of computer components can fall into this category.

Many

times in the last decade the Los Alamos National Laboratory
has fallen prey to theft of computer hard drives containing
nuclear secrets.
Computer-based crime is likely more widespread than
reported.

Most of these crimes are traditional crimes that

have been modernized by computers.
major part of this category.

Identity theft is a

Before modern computing,

identity theft was difficult and time consuming.

To steal

one's identity, the criminal had to start by stealing a
valued possession, such as a wallet or purse.

From there,

one could glean information such as Social Security Number,
date of birth, address, and credit card numbers.

One could

take this information and have a new Social Security card
and birth certificate issued, subsequently using those
documents to procure government-issued identity documents.
These allowed the criminal to open lines of credit with
retailers in the victim's name and fleece both retailer and
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credit company.

Modern identity theft is much easier.

Most victims willingly give their information through
social engineering and phishing techniques.

It is now

possible to steal the identities of many people rapidly
with little or no effort.
Another ancient crime that has become much easier to
perpetrate with the increase of Internet presence into
everyday life is the propagation of scams.

One of the most

common scams found on the Internet is the Nigerian 419
scam, named after the section of the Nigerian criminal code
that this type of crime falls under.

A con artist no

longer needs to meet their victims face-to-face or try to
create a working relationship with them to part them from
their money.

All that is necessary is sending an email to

the intended victim asking them to participate in a getrich-quick scheme, usually the transfer of large sums of
money from Nigeria into their local bank account.

The

intended victim gets to keep a percentage of the money,
usually in the millions of U.S. dollars, for helping get
the money out of Africa.

All that is necessary is sending

your personal bank account information to the person who
contacted you.

Unfortunately, too many people, mainly

senior citizens, have fallen prey to this type of scam.
Yet another major neo-traditional crime that has
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become much easier with modern computers and the Internet
is child pornography.

No longer is it necessary for child

pornographers to peddle their disgusting wares through
seedy fly-by-night mail order companies or in legitimate
adult bookstores in which knowing a special code phrase or
secret handshake will get pedophiles the filth they want.
The Internet has made the delivery of child pornography
rapidly available to those who seek it.

In fact, the North

American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) has a web site
that encourages the legalization of child pornography and
sex between adults and children.

What was once an

underground movement has almost become mainstream and
legitimized because of the Internet.
Other traditional crimes that have become modernized
due to computers are illegal bookmaking, racketeering,
counterfeiting, forgery, insider trading, and embezzlement
(such as the salami slicing technique that was first
introduced to most people in the movies Superman III and
Office Space).

New types of crimes have sprung up directly

related to computing.

Cybersquatting is the practice of

buying Internet domain names belonging to companies or
famous people and then trying to sell them to said
organizations for an unbelievable mark-up in price or just
not allowing ownership of them by those who should
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legitimately have ownership rights.
by Congressional legislation.

This has been outlawed

Cyberstalking and

cyberharassment have moved the traditional crime of
stalking or harassing someone into a virtual realm.

The

cyberstalker can harass their victim almost anonymously to
the point in which the victim no longer wants to use a
computer.

Online pharmacies are supposedly selling

prescription drugs to people who want them by having a
phony doctor write them an online prescription without a
physical consultation and having them filled and shipped to
their home illegally.

Finally, the most common computer-

based crime, as it was recently outlawed, is the
dissemination of spam.
large volumes.

Spam is unwanted email, usually in

Everyone who has an email address has

fallen victim to spammers.
Forensically Combating Modern Computer Crime
The problem with committing crimes of any nature,
especially computer crimes, is the fact that evidence of
the crime is always left behind.

No matter how great the

cover-up of a computer crime, with enough determination and
with the appropriate tools virtually all computer crimes
can be solved.

Does this necessarily mean that a

perpetrator will be convicted or if someone will even be
captured?

No.

But the evidence found should point to the
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fact that some sort of crime was committed.
How can we combat modern computer crime using computer
forensics?

Computer forensics is an after the fact (ex

post facto in legal terms) process.

If the process is

performed after the fact, how can it be used to fight
crime?

First, computer forensics can be used to secure

digital evidence that a crime has committed and can be
entered into court proceedings as circumstantial evidence.
As far as I know, no one has ever been convicted on
computer evidence alone.

However, many criminals have been

convicted by the computer evidence in conjunction with
volumes of other evidence.

Second, computer forensics can

be used to validate the source of a crime being committed,
whether it be human or machine.

Third, computer forensics

can be used to promote awareness of the power of
information and how it can used and misused by average
people.

Finally, computer forensics can be used to learn

about new forms of Internet-based attacks before they are
common knowledge.

By implementing computer systems such as

honeypots and analyzing them frequently, we are able to
identify new attacks and create fixes or patches for them
so that when they become commonplace, they will be easily
defeated or eradicated.
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Computer Forensics vs. Computers in Forensics
Computer forensics, as stated previously, is the art
and science of examining computer media for digital
evidence to be useful in a court of law.

There is a

difference between computer forensics and computers in
forensics.

One way computers can be used in forensics is

through software forensics.

The purpose of software

forensics is not to look for general digital evidence for
court proceedings.

Software forensics is mostly concerned

with examining malware.

By analyzing a piece of malware,

the software forensics analyst is attempting to determine
certain aspects concerning the software.

Discovering

information such as how the code was written, how it
behaves, how it propagates, and ideally identifying the
person(s) who created it are the major goals of software
forensics.

Although computers must be used in this area of

forensics, it is not computer forensics.
Next, an example of computers in forensics is the
Echelon system.

The Echelon system is the computer system

used by the United States and allies to listen to wireless
(and some say wired) phone conversations and computer
traffic around the world.

It roughly works this way:

the

National Security Agency (NSA) created an algorithm known
as Semantic Forests.

It was then licensed to Raytheon
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Company.

Raytheon uses this algorithm as a basis for its

commercial product, SilentRunner.
SilentRunner back to the NSA.

Raytheon then leased

SilentRunner is then

implemented on Echelon's computer systems.

All phone

conversations intercepted by Echelon are recorded and
computer transcribed into text documents.

SilentRunner has

been programmed to "understand" the meaning of the message
as opposed to just keyword searching a document.

"...they

(the NSA) wanted the computer to be able to "think," and be
able to interpret the contextual meaning of a document,
just as a human brain would interpret the nuances of a
written communication" [Anastasi, 217].

Therefore, the

computer forensically analyzes the conversation and
determines its meaning.

Many terrorist coded messages have

been intercepted and cracked using this method.

Although

this is a good example of computers in forensics, it is not
computer forensics.
Finally, computers can be used in forensic
examinations conducted by investigative laboratories.
Popularized by television programs such as CSI, viewers can
see how computers are beneficial to forensic
investigations.

One recent episode showed how a computer

could create a mirror image of a photograph and combine
that image with the original to form a new image.
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Although

an example of computers in forensics, it is definitely not
computer forensics.
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CHAPTER III
LEGAL ISSUES IN COMPUTER FORENSICS
Disclaimer: I am not an attorney and am not offering legal advice on any matters in this section of the
thesis. Do not accept my opinions as legitimate legal opinions. By reading this section you agree not to
hold the author nor the University of Louisville responsible for any actions taken by the reader in
accordance with the information listed in Chapter III.

U.S. Constitution Fourth Amendment Rights
Many people are worried today that their individual
rights and right-to-privacy are being eroded by the state.
Although this is the opinion of some, there are still many
protections available to citizens.

The first line of

protection from government intrusion is the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution: The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized [Archives].

Obviously the Founding

Fathers of our nation had no concept of computers when they
wrote the Bill of Rights in the late 18th century.

Yet,

these general protections do apply to our computers and
information in the 21st century.
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In a rough summary, a

warrant is necessary to be sworn out to seize and search a
computer by an agent acting on the behalf of the government
with some exceptions:
●

Consent:

If the owner of the computer agrees to allow

the seizing and/or searching of the machine, then no
warrant is necessary.
●

Third-Party Consent:

If the computer is routinely

used by a group of individuals, then any of the
regular users may give consent.

If the computer is

also used by a spouse or domestic partner, that person
may give consent.

If the computer is owned by a

minor, the minor's parents may give consent.

If the

computer belongs to a private network (e.g. in the
workplace), a system administrator may give consent.
●

Implied Consent:

If the owner of a computer has

voluntarily given up parts of their 4th Amendment
rights (such as in terms of employment) then the
consent to search and seizure may be implied.
●

Exigent Circumstances:

Exigent circumstances apply

when it is necessary to search and seize if an agent
of the government believes that it must be done to
prevent the imminent destruction of data.

This is

usually difficult to prove ex post facto; therefore it
is advantageous to get a warrant in this situation.
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●

Plain View:

If a crime is committed with a computer

in plain view of an agent of the government, a warrant
is not necessary to seize the computer on which the
crime was committed nor one needed for the subsequent
searching of data.

The plain view doctrine does not

authorize agents to open and view the contents of a
computer file that they are not otherwise authorized
to open and review [S&S].
●

Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest:

If you are in

possession of an electronic device (such as a pager or
PDA) at the time of your arrest, a government agent
may be able to seize the device and search it without
a warrant.
●

Border Searches:

If someone is attempting to import

an electronic device such as a computer into the U.S.
from a foreign country, the government has the right
to search and seize these devices without warrant.
(Each bulleted topic comes directly from [S&S].

The

summations are my own except where annotated.)
The preeminent question concerning the Fourth Amendment
is this:

How does it directly apply to computer forensics?

Whether we are directly an agent of the government (such as
a law enforcement officer) or an acting agent of the
government (such as a private contractor to a law
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enforcement agency), we must abide by the restrictions
placed upon us by the Fourth Amendment.
the

We must abide by

terms of the warrant that specify exactly what we are

allowed to seize and search pertaining to computer systems.
If no warrant was executed, then we must make sure we are
within the narrow bounds of the warrant-less exceptions.
We should do this by receiving a written legal opinion from
the appropriate government agent stating that the search
met the warrant-less criteria and that our forensic
analysis does not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of
the computer's owner.
Non-Government Agent Searches
Unfortunately, your rights under the Fourth Amendment
do not apply when search and seizure is performed by a nongovernment agent.

A non-government agent is one that is

not directly an agent of government (e.g. law enforcement)
or acting upon the behalf of a government agency.
Generally, searches in this section pertain to matters of
tort law, also known as civil law or civil matters.

In

these arenas, subpoenas are usually issued as a method of
forcing someone to turn over a computer for searching.
forensics examiner must make sure that any subpoenaed
computers are examined as if there was a search warrant
issued and take care to follow the proper guidelines.
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The

When involving matters of the workplace, the seizure
and searching of computers can be a tricky matter.

Usually

consent for an investigation is given by the owner (most
times the company) of the computers.

In accordance with

most corporate end-user agreements, an employee waives
their right of privacy pertaining to usage of the company's
computer systems.

There is a thin line, though, concerning

what information can be seized and used in civil matters.
There is debate in the courts and the legal community about
personal information stored on these computers and the gray
area of violating one's privacy.

What information is

considered personal and what is considered company
property?

Even if a voice mail system is company property,

the contents of the voice mails themselves may not be.

It

depends on the jurisdiction as to how they interpret these
quandaries.

For the forensic examiner, it is best to

produce all possible information and allow the attorneys to
sort out the legal issues.

Nevertheless, since the analyst

will probably be called to testify, it is best to at least
have some knowledge of how the local court system views
these issues.
U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001
As it pertains to cybercrime, the U.S.A. Patriot Act
of 2001 has redefined many provisions in current statutory
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law of the U.S. Code that either pertain directly or
indirectly to our forensics investigations.

In summary:

Section 814 makes a number of changes
to improve 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. This
section increases penalties for hackers
who damage protected computers (from a
maximum of 10 years to a maximum of 20
years); clarifies the mens rea required
for such offenses to make explicit that
a hacker need only intend damage, not a
particular type of damage; adds a new
offense for damaging computers used for
national security or criminal justice;
expands the coverage of the statute to
include computers in foreign countries
so long as there is an effect on U.S.
interstate or foreign commerce; counts
state convictions as "prior offenses"
for purpose of recidivist sentencing
enhancements; and allows losses to
several computers from a hacker’s
course of conduct to be aggregated for
purposes of meeting the $5,000
jurisdictional threshold. [USAPA2001]
These changes indirectly affect our forensic
investigations.

Specifically, if in the course of our

analysis we determine that someone has illegally gained
access to the system with the intent to damage the
computer, a whole host of penalties may be enacted upon
that person.

Thus, it is no longer necessary to prove that

specific damage was done to a computer (e.g. data
destruction or theft of intellectual property) but that the
intruder's intent was to damage the computer.

This affects

the scope of the investigation because now the forensic

30

examiner must now only determine that an intrusion was made
with the idea of damaging the computer instead of actually
proving that damage was done.

This technically releases a

lot of investigative burden from the examiner.
As a side note, I am personally mortified by how
broadly this concept has been written into the law and how
even more broadly the law can be interpreted.

How is it

possible to know a person's exact motive in relation to
accessing a computer?

Some signs of intent can be evident

such as unauthorized creation of user accounts and log file
editing to remove traces of sessions.
interpretation of the law end?

But where does the

I foresee the possibility

of using this provision of the Patriot Act to levy
penalties upon what we generally would refer to as
“innocent mistakes.”

For example, someone mistakenly logs

into a system without authorization (I have heard of it
happening many times before with some systems using autologin utilities) and when realizing their mistake end the
session.

This unauthorized entry can easily be

misconstrued as an attempt to damage a system by
hypersensitive network administrators and criminal charges
can be filed against the perpetrator.

Also frightening is

the classification of specific computers as being used for
national security or criminal justice.
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In combination with

the intent to damage, further penalties can be levied
against someone making an “innocent mistake” if the
computer has been labeled as “used for national security or
criminal justice.”

Since there is not really a definite

standard for labeling a computer in this manner, anyone can
arbitrarily determine that a computer is to be labeled in
this manner.

When you happen to access most computer

systems, they usually do not identify their purpose to the
user.

Therefore, a prosecuting attorney could, at a later

time, label a computer in such a manner as to levy more
penalties upon a defendant.
There are some positive aspects to the Patriot Act.
Section 816 requires the Attorney General to establish such
regional computer forensic laboratories as he considers
appropriate, and to provide support for existing computer
forensic laboratories, to enable them to provide certain
forensic and training capabilities. The provision also
authorizes the spending of money to support those
laboratories [USAPA2001].

This is gainful as the

University of Louisville is a direct beneficiary of this
provision.
Other U.S. Statutes Pertaining to Computer Crimes
There are a few other federal statutes that computer
forensics examiners must be aware of since the information
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that is gathered may fall directly under the jurisdiction
of the following laws:
●

18 USC § 1030 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection
with Computers:

This law pertains to the unauthorized

access of computers used by the U.S. government or
financial institutions.
●

18 USC § 2701 Unlawful Access to Stored
Communications:

This law pertains to the

unauthorized access of email communications that
reside in a storage medium.

In other words, if you

steal or access emails that are stored on a hard
drive, CD/DVD ROM disc, floppy disk, etc., and destroy
or alter them, you are in violation of this statute.
How these laws affect a forensics analyst is by placing the
burden of finding proof on us.

If someone is charged under

either one of these statutes, the examiner must produce the
proof if any exists.
There are other statutes that pertain to computer
crimes but would not fall directly into the scope of this
thesis.

Pertaining to the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001 and

the above sections of the U.S. Code, it should be evident
that more technology-savvy people are needed to help craft
future laws concerning computers.
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State and Local Regulations Concerning
Computer Crime and Individual Rights
The Commonwealth of Kentucky has a multitude of laws
in its Kentucky Revised Statutes that pertain to computer
crimes:
●

KRS 434.845 Unlawful Access to a Computer in the First
Degree.

●

KRS 434.850 Unlawful Access to a Computer in the
Second Degree.

●

KRS 434.851 Unlawful Access to a Computer in the Third
Degree.

●

KRS 434.853 Unlawful Access to a Computer in the
Fourth Degree.

●

KRS 434.855 Misuse of Computer Information

●

KRS 510.155 Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to Induce
a Minor to Engage in Sexual or Other Prohibited
Activities -- Prohibition of Multiple Convictions
Arising From Single Course of Conduct.

These statutes place the burden on the examiner to produce
evidence, if any.

For KRS 434.845, .850, .851, and .853

the analyst must determine if unlawful access was obtained
and what damage was done.

It is then up to the

Commonwealth's attorney to decide under which statute to
pursue charges.

For KRS 434.855, .845 must first be
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violated and the information is either stolen or received.
KRS 510.155 pertains to chatting up a minor on the Internet
for purposes of sexual acts being committed by or on said
minor.

This provision also covers state government agents

posing as minors on the Internet.

Since chat logs can be

stored on a hard drive (and most are), the forensics
examiner must produce any evidence relating to violation of
this statute.
From what I can gather from the web pages of the
Louisville Metro government
(http://www.louisvilleky.gov/MetroCouncil/default.htm), it
apparently defaults to KRS law concerning computer crimes
as I could not find any ordinances pertaining to them.
What is evident is that anyone who wishes to be
employed as a computer forensics analyst must be wellversed in the applicable laws surrounding search and
seizure.

Not only must one have assurance that what

actions one performs are legal, but one must be prepared to
justify what actions one took and why.
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CHAPTER IV
MOTIVATION FOR TOPIC
Why are Forensic Analysts Necessary?
The need for forensic analysts is four-fold.

First,

with the advent of inexpensive personal computers it has
become easy to own one.

Personal computers are no longer

only in the possession of the wealthy or universities.
Many households have at least one, if not many, computers.
Internet access is also becoming cheaper.

Gone are the

days of Internet access being limited to those who could
afford the per-minute charges of dial-up access.

It is now

cheaper to have a 6 Mb/s Internet connection than basic
cable television.

The combination of cheaper and faster

personal computers coupled with cheaper and faster Internet
access has created an environment in which computer-related
crime has become rampant.
Next, the number of companies who have become computeroriented has dramatically risen in the last decade.

Most

companies today that do not have an Internet presence
cannot compete with those who do.

Internally, companies

have also replaced archaic manual work practices with
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modern computer-based practices.

The popularity of

relational database management systems (RDBMS) by vendors
such as Oracle, IBM, and Microsoft are an example of this
trend.

These RDBMS systems have simplified the storage and

retrieval of massive amounts of data by almost entirely
eliminating the need for filing cabinets full of
irreplaceable combustible paper materials.

Drafting and

architectural design has almost completely migrated to
Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) tools.

Due to these

advancements, companies have become greatly computer-based.
Combine this with having an Internet presence and you have
created an environment in which computer-related crime and
theft of trade secrets can thrive.
Thirdly, with computer-related crime rising, Law
Enforcement is having a much greater time combating this
non-traditional criminal field.

Most local police

departments, save for ones in major metropolitan areas,
have neither the manpower nor the time or budget to
investigate computer-related crimes.

Law Enforcement

agencies are generally understaffed and underfunded for
investigating traditional crimes and would rather allocate
their meager resources to destroying methamphetamine labs,
arresting burglary and murder suspects, and policing
neighborhoods than tracking down hackers and disgruntled
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employees.

Therefore, no training is given to recruits in

tracking computer crimes at most police academies.

Most

departments who maintain computer crime divisions must
spend large sums of money to train seasoned officers to
cope with the dynamics of changing digital crimes.
Finally, the reluctance of Law Enforcement to intercede
in civil matters is well-known.

Information valuable to

civil litigation can be stored on computers.

The

activities of a cheating spouse can possibly be found on a
personal computer.

Information pertaining to misuse of

computer systems by an employee can be beneficial to a
company that is the defendant of a wrongful termination
lawsuit.

By viewing the contents of a computer, a

defendant accused of pirating software, movies, or music
can prove their innocence or ensure their guilt.
These four situations prove a singular point:
forensic analysts are necessary.
buried in computer media.

computer

Criminal activity can be

Civil lawsuits can hinge

entirely on computer-based information.

The only sure-fire

method of producing the necessary information for criminal
and civil proceedings is through computer forensics.

Only

a well-trained computer forensics analyst can procure and
produce this data and make it stand up in a court of law.
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Why is Computer Forensics Training Necessary?
The necessity of computer forensics training is very
evident.

As a law enforcement tool, it can be invaluable

in tying together the activities or associations of
suspects or groups.

It can also be used by attorneys to

establish the fault or prove the innocence of a defendant.
Many large companies are now keeping computer forensic
analysts on staff to augment their Information Security
teams.

Some corporations, such as Deloitte & Touche, LLC,

even have large, multi-location computer forensics
departments that can image and analyze massive volumes of
information at many locations given little notice.
Currently, Law Enforcement in general is unable to
handle the case load presented by computer crime in
addition to traditional criminal activities.

The possible

steps for the law enforcement community to rectify this
situation are to either train their own members to perform
computer forensics work, thus removing much needed manpower
from traditional sectors, or hire civilians.

Although the

Federal Government is stepping forward to help Law
Enforcement by creating regional forensics centers in major
metropolitan areas, eventually this may not be enough.
Training civilians willing to work for Law Enforcement in
the area of computer forensics must be the solution.
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In

fact, some of the regional forensics centers, initially
only staffed by law enforcement officers trained in
computer forensics, have had to hire civilians to cope with
the overwhelming amount of casework with which they have
been presented.
In the civil arena, attorneys will need to hire
private, impartial firms to perform computer forensics as
necessary.

This is usually essential in cases of wrongful

termination due to computer misuse.

Even if the defendant

company has its own internal computer forensic analysis
team, a good plaintiff's attorney would be able to raise
reasonable doubt concerning the information captured and
analyzed by a non-neutral party.

Therefore, an ably

trained computer forensic analyst who is impartial is
crucial.
It is my goal to ensure that computer forensics
training is available to not only Law Enforcement but to
any competent and educated civilian willing to pursue the
field as their career.

They must be as passionate about

computer forensics as I am and not just consider it a hobby
or means to make money.

They must be willing to further

explore the art and science of it and commit to further
research so that the discipline does not become stagnant.
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Definition of Thesis Scope
Although the field of computer forensics is wideranging, covering topics such as live network capture, raid
array analysis, etc., the scope of this thesis is rather
narrow.

This thesis will focus exclusively on hard drive

analysis from machines that are not running when
information capture takes place.

This is the most common

form of computer forensics analysis today.

Incorporating a

wider field of the types of analysis would only serve to
distract from the main focus.
We can further refine our scope by identifying the
specific major tasks of our methodology and praxis.

In the

acquisition phase, we will concentrate on sanitizing media,
acquiring data, and chain of custody.

In the analysis

phase, we will concentrate on finding obvious information,
keyword searching, auditing log files, malware detection,
file header rectification, NTFS alternate data streams,
image processing, and data carving.

Finally, in the post-

analysis phase, we will concentrate on documentation
lifecycle and report writing.
By rather narrowly defining our scope, we should be
able to incorporate most necessary tasks used in a
forensics analysis and guard against scope creep by staying
within the defined guidelines.
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CHAPTER V
SURVEY OF LITERATURE
Search and Seizure of Information
A search was legally defined by the courts in State
vs Woodall as “an examination of a man’s house or other
buildings or premises, or of his person, or of his vehicle,
aircraft, etc., with a view to the discovery of contraband
or illicit or stolen property, or some evidence of guilt to
be used in the prosecution of a criminal action for some
crime or offense with which he is charged” (according to
Black’s Law Dictionary).

A seizure was defined in Molina

vs State as “the act of taking possession of property,
e.g., for a violation of law or by virtue of an execution”
[of a warrant] [Shinder & Tittel, 588].

These terms define

are generally accepted when pertaining to physical items.
But how can these terms apply to the concept of information
which is an intangible quantity?

In other words, how can

we search for and seize something that doesn't physically
exist?

In Chapter III of this thesis, I detailed my

interpretation of the rights of search and seizure as
provided by various laws such as the Fourth Amendment to
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the Constitution, the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, and
various Kentucky Revised Statutes.

In this section, we

will explore the ideas and recommendations concerning
search and seizure techniques as they relate to computer
forensics from readily available technical books.
In his book, John Vacca breaks down the searching and
seizing of information in four easy to remember steps:
1. Preparation
2. Snapshot
3. Transport
4. Examination
In the preparation phase, Vacca emphasizes preparation
before proceeding to the search and seizure location.

Tips

are to make sure all media have been sanitized and
documented as such (Vacca, 136).

He also recommends that

if you are not the person to perform the analysis, you need
to make sure you the person you have chosen to perform the
examination.

The person needs to be highly skilled and be

able to competently testify in court concerning the methods
used to perform the analysis and what information was found
in the search (Vacca, 136-7).
In the snapshot phase, Vacca recommends literally
taking snapshots of the scene of the seizure.

He wants

photos of the entire physical area surrounding the machine
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to be seized.

After that, photographs of the actual

computer the seizing is performed on is to be photographed
in detail.

Make sure to document every component and type

of connection whether internal or external.

Vacca then

goes on to explain labeling everything in accordance with
your predetermined methodology.

The evidence custodian at

the scene (if you have one) is to then go through and
validate everything that has been done in the investigation
thus far.

What sets Vacca apart from other works I have

read is his insistence on videotaping the entrance upon the
scene of all personnel involved, all actions of the
searching and seizing, the exiting the scene, and the
transportation and storage of the seized materials.

He

recommends this so no defense attorney can claim that
evidence was planted by the person or team performing the
search and seizure (Vacca, 137-8).
In the transport phase, Vacca first assumes that the
forensic investigators have the authority to transport the
seized items to an off-site location.

After making

recommendations for packing and transporting, he once again
is adamant about videotaping (or photographing in this
step) the evidence leaving the scene and its journey to the
transport vehicle.

He also strongly recommends

videotaping/photographing and documenting the moving of the
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evidence from the transport vehicle into the storage or
examination facility (Vacca, 138).
In the final phase, examination, Vacca explains
documenting the preparation of the seized information.
Unpacking and visually inspecting the evidence is first.
He then recommends making duplicates of the hard drive if
this was not done on-scene.

When finished, it is now time

to inspect the BIOS of the seized machine and check for
time discrepancies.
documented.

Both of these previous steps must be

When finished duplicating the original drive,

you are then to seal it in an anti-static bag and store it
in a proper storage facility (Vacca, 138-9).
Chain of Custody
Chain of custody is primarily a list of persons and
their respective time and places in which they have come
into contact with or possession of a piece of evidence.
Douglas Schweitzer states that “the chain-of-custody
process is used to maintain and document the chronological
history of the evidence” [Schweitzer, 149].

He recommends

having two forensic investigators assigned to each case so
that each can observe and document the steps of the other.
He highly recommends over-documenting because of the
importance of chain of custody to computer forensics.

He

maintains that one of the most well-known tactics used in a
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courtroom is the claim of mishandling evidence (see the
notorious O.J. Simpson trial).

By documenting everything

possible, you minimize this possibility (Schweitzer, 149).
Schweitzer includes a checklist of items to note as you are
working on the case:
●
●
●

●

●

●

●
●

●
●

●
●

The current date and time (include appropriate time
zone)
Broken hardware or any significant problems
Note on the evidence found, which will go into your
final report in more detail. These would essentially
be notes that anyone could pick up and, at a glance,
know exactly where you left off in your assessment of
the seized computer and media.
Special techniques (for example, sniffers, password
crackers, and so on.) used above and beyond normal
processes.
Outside sources used (for example, third-party
companies or products that helped to provide
assistance and information)
The names of all personnel involved in the
investigation including a list of administrators
responsible for the routine maintenance of systems
A record of all applications running on the suspect's
computer
A list of who had access to the collected evidence
including date and time of access, as well as date and
time of any actions taken by those with access. In
addition, the clock of the affected system must be
compared with the actual current time and any
discrepancies must be noted with the system clock left
unchanged. Adjustment of the clock may subsequently
be considered data tampering, leaving the resultant
evidence inadmissible.
Details of the initial assessment leading to the
formal investigation
Circumstances surrounding the suspected incident
including who initially reported the suspected
incident along with date and time
A complete list of all computer systems included in
the investigation along with system specifications
A printed copy of any organizational policies and
logon banners that relate to accessing and using
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●

computer systems
A comprehensive list of steps used to collect and
analyze evidence (All points [Schweitzer, 149-50])
While making these notes, Schweitzer recommends you do

so in a notebook in which pages cannot be removed.

This

should prevent a legal defense team from claiming that
information beneficial to their client was removed from the
notebook.
I chose to profile the Schweitzer book in this section
because it presents the most comprehensive information
relating to chain of custody and its importance to a
forensics investigation.

I believe this is so because his

book focuses more on incident response, which is the first
phase of an investigation, than the actual computer
forensics analysis process.

Mandia, Prosise, & Pepe's

Incident Response & Computer Forensics placed more emphasis
upon the physical handling of evidence as opposed to the
chain of custody documentation (Mandia et al., Chapter 9).
Nelson et al.'s Computer Forensics and Investigations
barely even mentions chain of custody (Nelson et al., 28)
but does provide a sample chain of custody form for a
corporate investigation.

The list what the differing

fields of the form are, but no explanation of what should
be recorded or in what manner (Nelson et al., 34-6).
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Data Acquisition
There is a bit of debate in the computer forensics
community about whether to create a bit-stream duplicate of
a suspect hard drive or just to make an image of it.
Creating a bit-stream duplicate involves transferring all
information bit-by-bit from one hard drive to another
without changing the information on the source drive.

In

other words, a bit-stream duplicate is an exact clone of
its parent.

An image is similar to a bit-stream duplicate

in that it copies all bits from the source drive but
differs in how it stores this information.

The imaging

process creates a file (or multiple files) containing this
information as opposed cloning a hard drive.

These files

can be compressed for easier storage and transportation or
can remain uncompressed.

The advantage of imaging is that

the information can be stored on CD or DVD media and
transported easier than a duplicated hard drive.

The

advantage of a bit-stream duplicate is the ability to
actually use (or reuse) the hard drive as it was in the
suspect machine.

Whichever route is taken, the information

must be verified using MD5 or SHA checksums on both the
source and target drives.
Most of my sources I explored for this section
recommend creation of a bit-stream duplicate ((Carrier, 47-

48

9), (Kruse & Heiser, 15), (Mandia et al., Chapter 7),
(Nelson, et al., 47-9), (NTI, Section 4), (Schweitzer, 4951), (Vacca, 35-37)) as their preferred method of copying
the information from a suspect hard drive.

The lone

holdout is Shinder & Tittel's Scene of the Cybercrime:
Computer Forensics Handbook.

This book never actually

mentions bit-stream duplication and concentrates solely on
imaging (Shinder & Tittel, 560).

Schweitzer refers to bit-

stream duplication as “imaging” (Schweitzer, 49) and
Nelson, et al. gives definitions and explanations of the
differences between both (Nelson, et al., 47).
As for recommendations of what tools to use to perform
a bit-stream duplication, dd is the most common tool
mentioned for a software-based copy , although NTI's
SafeBack software ((Mandia et al., 164-8), (Nelson et al.,
293), (NTI, Section 4), (Vacca, 35-37)) is the one
mentioned most after dd.

For hardware-based copies, the

ICS ImageMASSter Solo is the hardware device recommended
most ((Kruse & Heiser, 14-5), (Mandia et al., 154),
(Nelson, et al., 205-6)).
All sources highly emphasize the need to verify that
the information on the source and target drives are exact
via MD5 or SHA sums.

The need to ensure that the data on

the suspect drive was not disturbed prior to duplication is
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also impressed upon the reader.
Examination Guidelines
Even though the sources used for this thesis are in
relative agreement in the previous section concerning
forensic duplication, they will diverge greatly come the
examination guidelines section.

Each source has and should

have their own opinions concerning the steps of
examination.

What I did not expect was the great diversity

of these opinions.

All are valid.

However, I can believe

it may lead to confusion amongst those who choose to learn
forensic examination procedures from only one source.
Therefore, this section will detail a cross-examination of
the recommendations provided by the various authors.
Beginning with Marcella et al.'s Cyber Forensics – A
Field Manual for Collecting, Examining, and Preserving
Evidence of Computer Crimes, the editors decide to break
down the examination guidelines into two sections, nonliturgical (Marcella et al., Chapter 2) and liturgical
(Marcella et al., Chapter 3) forensic examinations.

A non-

liturgical examination is one that is not expected to
involve a trial or legal action of some sort.

A liturgical

examination is one in which a trial or legal action is
expected.

I do not think this is wise as it impresses upon

the reader that one can approach an investigation from
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either point of view and this can affect the outcome of the
information found.

I can understand why they would perform

differing investigations, but I still feel leery about it.
How I differ in my approach is to treat all investigations
as liturgical because you never know if your examination
will become a component of a trial.

Your investigation may

cause someone to be fired and in turn they sue their former
employer for wrongful termination.

The examination you

performed must be thorough enough to withstand the scrutiny
of a well-prepared defense attorney.

Therefore, unless I

had in writing the requirement to perform a non-liturgical
analysis with the stipulation that I would be held without
fault if the case were to ever proceed to trial, I would
perform a liturgical analysis.

This would be done to

protect me from being incorrectly sued by a client who
believes that my non-liturgical examination harmed them.
The non-liturgical examination process recommended by
Marcella et al. is rather non-invasive.

Its first step is

to isolate the equipment (Marcella et al., 27-8).

Making

sure you are investigating and duplicating the correct
machine is of utmost priority in this step.

Once seized,

an examination of cookies (Marcella et al., 29-31),
bookmarks (Marcella et al., 31-2), history buffer (Marcella
et al., 32-4), cache (Marcella et al., 34), temporary
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Internet files (Marcella et al., 35), tracking of logon
duration and times (Marcella et al., 35-6), recent document
list (Marcella et al., 36), tracking of illicit software
installation and use (Marcella et al., 37-8), reviewing the
system (Marcella et al., 38-41), a manual review (Marcella
et al., 41-2), and hidden files (Marcella et al., 42-3) is
performed.

As this is a highly non-invasive procedure, I

believe the only conclusions that can be drawn from this
type of investigation is whether or not an employee
violated the company's AUP (acceptable use policy for the
computer systems).

Not much more information can be

gathered using the steps prescribed by Marcella et al.
There can be many comparisons drawn between the
different sources pertaining to a liturgical examination.
By default, the other sources imply performing a liturgical
examination by the more invasive methodologies they
recommend ((Kruse & Heiser, 16-9), (Mandia et al., Chapter
11), (Nelson, et al., Chapter 10)).

Kruse & Heiser

recommend beginning with a cursory examination of the
master boot record and boot sector of a drive using either
a hex editor or a forensic examination program (Kruse &
Heiser, 16).

Next, they recommend using whatever search

tools you have available, whether your hex editor or
forensic program, to perform a keyword search on the system
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(Kruse & Heiser, 16).

Mandia et al. and Nelson et al.

unfortunately spend most of their time not explaining
techniques as much as seemingly pitching forensic
examination software products and giving an overview of the
techniques using these products ((Mandia et al., 244-59),
(Nelson et al., 322-35)).
upon the next step:

Two of the sources then agreed

retrieving deleted files ((Kruse &

Heiser, 17), (Mandia et al., 260-75)).

Finally, Kruse &

Heiser and Mandia et al. recommend examining slack space
and unallocated clusters for fragments or entire pieces of
files ((Kruse & Heiser, 17), (Mandia et al., 275-8)).
Interesting to note is the importance that Nelson et
al. places on finding hidden data.

Even though the book

virtually ignored the general concept of retrieving deleted
files, it does produce a fine section concerning common
data hiding techniques (Nelson et al., 335-44).

The

techniques explored are hiding partitions (Nelson et al.,
335-7), marking bad clusters (Nelson et al., 337-8), bitshifting (Nelson et al., 338-42), steganography (Nelson et
al., 342-3), file encryption (Nelson et al., 343), and
recovering passwords (Nelson et al., 344).
As for Marcella et al., I was disappointed by their
chapter concerning liturgical examinations (Marcella et
al., Chapter 3).

This chapter was a rehash of the previous
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non-liturgical examination guidelines, focusing exclusively
on Microsoft Windows operating systems, with some
additions.

The additions were few and not really invasive

techniques.

The addition of searching the hard drive

temporary files (Marcella et al., 55), such as swap space,
and the registry (Marcella et al., 57-64) did not truly
offset the need for more invasive procedures that a
liturgical examination should include.
As for Vacca's book, he really did not cover the
techniques used to perform a forensics investigation.

His

book focused more on the steps up to and including the data
seizure, constructing a timeline based upon the seized
information, and information warfare.

It seems his book

prefers to focus on the acts committed as they are being
committed as opposed to finding the evidence of the acts ex
post facto.
Are these sources poor in nature?

By no means.

Most

of these sources choose to be more specific in their
chapters that deal with each popular operating system
individually.

Unlike Marcella et al.'s exclusive focus on

performing forensic examinations on Microsoft Windows-based
machines, the other three major sources have chapters or
sections of chapters pertaining to UNIX/Linux forensics
((Kruse & Heiser, Chapter 11), (Mandia et al., Chapter 13),
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(Nelson et al., sections of Chapters 4 & 10)).

They also

have chapters or sections of chapters dealing with Windows
forensics ((Kruse & Heiser, Chapter 8), (Mandia et al.,
Chapter 12), (Nelson et al., Chapter 3 and parts of Chapter
10)).

Since these specifics are beyond the scope of this

thesis, they will not be investigated.
Basic Report Structure
The best source I have read concerning the topic of
report writing is the National Institute of Justice's
Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence:
Enforcement.

A Guide for Law

Although the other sources gave their

opinions upon what should be included in a report ((Mandia
et al., Chapter 17), (Nelson, et al., Chapter 13)), I
believe it is best to trust the ones who run the courts,
the United States Government.

The reason why I am focusing

primarily on this source is that the likelihood that your
investigative case winds up in court is fairly high.

If

the government publishes a resource in which it outlines
what needs to be in a report, then we can safely assume
this is what is minimally expected to be entered as
evidence in a courtroom.

Does this mean that only these

items are to appear in the report?

No, but it does give us

a skeleton on which to craft our report around and add
additional items as necessary (specifically if the

55

prosecutor wanted certain findings highlighted).
The following list contains what, at a minimum, must be
in the examiner's report:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

●

Identity of the reporting agency.
Case identifier or submission number.
Case investigator.
Identity of the submitter.
Date of receipt.
Date of report.
Descriptive list of items submitted for examination,
including serial number, make, and model.
Identity and signature of the examiner.
Brief description of steps taken during examination,
such as string searches, graphics image searches, and
recovering erased files.
Results/conclusions. (All points [NIJ, 20])

The NIJ also states that it would be beneficial to include
the following even though it is not mandatory:
●
●

●
●

Summary of findings
Details of findings
This section should describe in greater detail the
results of the examinations and may include:
■ Specific files related to the request.
■ Other files, including deleted files, that
support the findings.
■ String searches, keyword searches, and text
string searches.
■ Internet-related evidence, such as Web site
traffic analysis, chat logs, cache files, e-mail,
and news group activity.
■ Graphic image analysis.
■ Indicators of ownership, which could include
program registration data.
■ Data analysis.
■ Description of relevant programs on the examined
items.
■ Techniques used to hide or mask data, such as
encryption, steganography, hidden attributes,
hidden partitions, and file name anomalies.
Supporting materials
Glossary (All points [NIJ, 20-1])
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In Appendix A of the NIJ source, the government has
compiled a list of sample cases with their sample
concluding reports that is an excellent source of
information for those concerned about how to format their
reports (NIJ, 23-38).
In general, even though the sources used may differ in
their approaches, one can create a basic methodology from
the summation of the information provided.
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CHAPTER VI
METHODOLOGY OF INSTRUCTION
Introduction to Methodology
The methodology I am proposing here is one that is
easily teachable in a classroom and laboratory setting.

By

no means is it complete as it remains in the scope of this
thesis.

This methodology may be comparable to what one

would receive if they attended a basic computer forensics
course provided by a proprietary company.

This methodology

is my informed opinion on what should be taught to students
in a graduate-level computer forensics course.

It has been

influenced by outside sources listed in the references.
The laboratory curricula of Appendix A of this thesis is to
be applied in the laboratory section of a computer
forensics course following this methodology.

Although it

does not cover all sections of the methodology, it does
complement its major topics.
Introduction to Standard PC Hardware
Students need to know the geometry of hard drives so
they will understand how an operating system physically
stores information on disk.

This is done so they will know
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how easy it is to hide information that is not evident to
the naked eye.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

●

Topics that should be addressed are:

Hard drive components and materials
Platters
Tracks
Cylinders
Sectors
Physical Sector Structure
Heads
Calculating hard drive capacity from CHS method
Multiple Zone Recording
Accessing the Drives
■ Interrupt 13 Access
■ 16-Bit ATA Addressing Access
■ Bit Shift Translation
■ Logical Block Addressing (LBA)
■ Extended Interrupt 13 Access
■ 48-Bit ATA/ATAPI Addressing Access
Host Protected Areas
Differing Media Standards
Students must be able to understand and differentiate

among the three major hard drive interfaces, their
respective generations, and various implementations of the
technologies.

This allows the student to be prepared when

he or she encounters a computer with a less than usual hard
drive interface or implementation scheme.

Topics that

should be addressed are:
●

●

IDE/ATA Interface (PATA)
■ Historical IDE Standards
■ Current ATA/ATAPI-6 Standard
■ Transfer Speeds (MB/s)
■ 40-pin, 80-pin, and Notebook Connectors
Serial-ATA Interface (SATA)
■ SATA/150 Standard (aka SATA/1.5Gb Standard)
■ SATA/3Gb Standard (aka SATA/300 Standard)
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Transfer Speeds (MB/s)
Connectors (Data and Power), Notebook Connectors
■ eSATA
SCSI Interface
■ Historical SCSI Standards
■ Current Ultra320 Standard
■ New Serial Attached SCSI Standard
■ Transfer Speeds (MB/s)
■ Various 50-pin Connectors, Current 68-pin and 80pin Connectors
■ SCSI Termination and Device IDs
RAID
■ What is RAID?
■ Common RAID Levels and Where Commonly Found
● RAID 0
● RAID 1
● RAID 5
● RAID 0+1
● RAID 1+0
● JBOD RAID
■ Software RAID Array vs. Hardware Implementation
■
■

●

●

System Documentation
Students need to learn the utmost importance of
documentation of all processes used and all evidence found.
It cannot be stressed enough by the instructor that a court
case may collapse solely upon the fact that the
documentation was shoddy, incomplete, or worse yet,
nonexistent.

The students must learn that even if the

steps they take seem inconsequential, they need to
document.
●
●

Topics that need to be addressed are:

Creating and continuing chain of custody forms
Documenting procedures
■ Tools used and purpose of tool
■ Search strings
■ Data carves
■ File rectification
■ Log examination
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Image viewing and processing
Etc.
Maintaining and storing documentation
Making sure documentation is easily readable
■
■

●
●

Data Capture and Verification
The first crucial step in computer forensics is the
accurate capture and verification of all information from a
suspect hard drive.

If this step is performed incorrectly,

it is virtually a waste of time to perform a forensic
analysis as the information captured is most likely
“dirty”, meaning the information probably changed moving
from the source drive to the target drive.

In this

section, an emphasis must be placed upon using all
precautions when capturing data and verifying that the
information has not been altered.

Topics that need to be

addressed are:
●

●
●
●
●
●

●

Target Media
■ New Hard Drives
■ Reusing Hard Drives
● Forensic Sanitizing
● DOD Standard for Forensic Sanitizing
■ New vs. Used Debate
Capture Situation: Seizure of Entire Computer System
vs. Hard Drive Seizure
Capture Situation: Live Capture vs. Lab Capture
The Great Debate: To Pull the Plug or Not? Shutting
Down Running Systems.
To Dump or Not to Dump? (Memory of a Running System)
Documenting a System with Photographs
■ Photographing the Screen of a Live System
■ Photographing (from all angles) an Entire
Computer System Being Seized
Common Methods of Capture
■ Portable Duplication Devices
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Duplicating or Imaging Using Lab-Based Equipment
Crossover Cable Capture
Forensic Bit-Stream Duplication
■ What Bit-Stream Duplication Is
■ Advantages Over Imaging
■ Logistics of Bit-Stream Duplication
● Cost
● Storage of Duplicates
■ Advantages of Having More Than One Duplicate
■ Devices for Duplication
■ Hashing the Source Hard Drive
● MD5 Sums
● SHA Sums
● Limitations and Attacks of MD5 Sums
● Limitations and Attacks of SHA Sums
■ Verification of Original (MD5 and/or SHA)
■ Verification of Duplicate (MD5 and/or SHA)
Forensic Imaging
■ What Forensic Imaging Is
■ Advantages Over Bit-Stream Duplication
■ Logistics of Forensic Imaging
● Cost
● Storage of Images
■ Hardware Write-Blockers
● Why They are Necessary
● Functions
● Various Types, Interfaces, and Manufacturers
■ Imaging Software
■ Verification of Original (MD5 and/or SHA)
■ Verification of Duplicate (MD5 and/or SHA)
Storage and Transportation of Suspect Hard Drives and
Duplicates/Images
■ Equipment Necessary for Short-Term Storage and
Transportation
● Lockable Container(s) (Preferably Padded)
● Anti-static Bubble Wrap and Bags
■ Equipment Necessary for Storage During Cases
● Heavy-Duty Personal Fire-Proof Safes
● Bank Vault Safe Deposit Boxes
● Company Vault
■ Equipment Necessary for Long-Term Storage
● Likelihood of Needing Long-Term Storage
● Dynamic Media (Hard Drives) vs. Static Media
(Tapes, DVD-ROM, etc.)
● Storage Conditions
■
■

●

●

●
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Chain of Custody
Of next most vital importance is chain of custody.
Chain of custody is the process of documenting when the
suspect and duplicate/image hard drives are in someone's
possession, who that person is, where and when it is being
stored when not in someone's possession, and what actions
are being performed on those drives.

Concepts that need to

be presented to the students are:
●

Chain of Custody Forms
■ What Should Be Included on a Chain of Custody
Form
■ Sample Chain of Custody Forms
■ How to Fill Out a Chain of Custody Form
■ How to Create a Custom Chain of Custody Form
■ Short- and Long-Term Storage of Forms
System Investigation, Non-Forensic Environment

PREFACE
The reasoning behind why there is even a discussion of
performing part of a system investigation in a non-forensic
environment is the additional benefits that come about
using these techniques.

I am a firm believer in making

multiple bit-stream duplicates or a single bit-stream
duplicate and multiple forensic images.

The multiple

copies will allow for a forensic and a non-forensic
viewing.
I am of the opinion that much is lost in a forensics
investigation if you cannot view the system “in context.”
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In other words, if you cannot get the look-and-feel of a
system and be able to search for obvious pieces of
evidence, you may not be getting the entire story being
presented by the suspect system.

This is why I prefer to

be able to seize an entire computer system so I can use one
of the bit-stream duplicates (definitely not the original
hard drive) to manually search a system.

Even without the

original computer system, the duplicate should work in
another computer system, usually with a tweaking of the
drivers.

This “in-context” look can help fill in the gaps

of the overall picture.

I can easily see what software is

installed on the system, what programs run upon system
startup, if malware is on the system, if hacktools or other
nefarious items exist, and other things that are more
complicated in a forensic environment.

Therefore, I

believe a full forensics analysis should not be done
without a non-forensic environment component.
Malware Detection Phase I
The first action that should be taken when starting
the system is to search for initial signs of malware.
There are many types of malware, but we are specifically
searching for booby-traps.

These are programs that are

created to destroy the contents of a hard drive if the
operating system is booted in a way that is unexpected.
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For example, if the system boots without the user pressing
a specific key combination, the software may be activated
to destroy the contents of the drive.

To circumvent this,

we should boot the system from a protected floppy disk and
physically search the hard drive for known booby-traps.

If

we are satisfied that none are present, then we should
reboot the system without the floppy in place.

If we

detect one, we should determine what is the sequence of
events to perform to allow for normal system booting or we
can attempt to destroy the booby-trap by physically
removing it from the system.
Understanding the Target Environment
Once we boot the system, we need to understand the
target environment.

The students should be taught the

following concepts in relation to this:
●
●

●
●
●
●

Determining if a login ID and password is necessary
■ Using tools to crack or change system passwords
Determining the Operating System
■ Forcing Microsoft systems to identify themselves
■ Forcing UNIX/Linux systems to identify themselves
Looking for customized PATH variables
Viewing user lists and group lists
Determining what processes are running
Listing open ports and services with the system idle
(this can be a great help in determining if any
malware or rogue processes exist)
Looking for Obvious Information
This is the section in which we search for obvious

pieces of evidence.

In a forensic environment, it can be
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easy to overlook things because you are seeing them in an
abstract manner and not in context.

Therefore, we will

begin searching for many things that may not appear obvious
in a forensic environment but should stand out in a nonforensic environment.
●

●

●
●

Things such as:

Start with the Desktop
■ Look at what files are on the Desktop.
■ Is there a custom background?
■ Is there a custom screen saver?
■ Is there a custom theme?
■ Is there a custom mouse pointer?
■ Do the shortcuts go to their intended programs or
files?
■ Are there mislabeled things on the Desktop?
■ In Windows, what are the recently viewed
documents and what are listed as favorites?
■ What are the programs that can be run from the
task bar/start menu?
Search the Documents area
■ Is there anything that obviously appears to be
evidence?
■ Is there anything that looks abnormal or out of
place?
Search for Email
■ Tracing email headers to determine true source
Search for installed software
■ Determine what programs are on the system
■ Look for software packages buried in non-default
locations. This could mean that someone is
trying to hide something.
■ Determine if anti-virus and/or anti-spyware
software is installed and if the definitions are
up-to-date.
The following sections do not necessarily need to be

performed in the order listed.
Log File Audit and Interpretation
●

Read the security log to determine who logged onto the
system and when.
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●
●
●

●

Read the event viewer log (for Windows) to determine
what programs have run (if enabled).
Read the history of commands run (for UNIX/Linux) to
determine what commands were issued.
If the system has a software firewall, determine its
settings and read the log for connections to and from
other machines.
Traverse any other logs the system may be keeping.
Malware Detection Phase II
In this section, we need to be on the lookout for any

forms of malware in the system.

Viruses, worms, Trojan

horses, spyware, adware, keyloggers, and nefarious cookies
can cause major problems to a computer.

I have been told

stories third-hand about how someone accused of being in
possession of child pornography was exonerated when a
forensics analyst determined that a Trojan horse or spyware
was surreptitiously downloading images to their system.

I

would even categorize programs that allow a user to destroy
data as malware.

We should sweep the system for malware

but not destroy it.

This sweeping should give us a listing

of what is plaguing the system.

We then should be able to

correlate with the logs the communications the machine
performed via the malware.

If the system contains anti-

virus or anti-spyware tools, we may also want to sweep the
system as a whole through a write-blocker (after booting
through a safe floppy disk or through another machine).
This may determine for us whether these tools had been
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disabled by the malware (this is very possible).

I would

also recommend sweeping with multiple tools as not all
tools will find all things.
Improper User/Privilege Detection
This is also a fairly easy technique to perform and
you will find this primarily in servers but it is known to
appear in PCs that have been hacked.

Most people who

create new user accounts on a system as a way to return to
a compromised computer for further exploration/damage,
storage of files, or to use as a base for launching attacks
on other systems.

Most lesser-skilled hackers are not

going to create account names that match the naming scheme
used by legitimate accounts.
spot the phony account.

This makes it rather easy to

For the accounts that seem to meet

the naming criteria but seem out of place (doesn't seem to
be in the correct user group, etc.), rectification with the
logs of when and from where the account was created is
necessary.

Non-default group names may also be a sign of

an intrusion.

If students are aware of the default user

groups in Windows and UNIX/Linux, it should make these
aberrations stand out.
System Investigation, Forensic Environment
PREFACE
In this section, there are some assumptions that need

68

to be made.

We are going to assume that the students have

available to them multiple forensics analysis tools
including at least one major analysis program (such as
EnCase, FTK, etc.) and multiple minor programs (data
carving tools, password crackers, file viewers, forensic
boot floppy, etc.).

We will also assume that the students

will be shown how to properly set up their equipment and
how to properly use these tools.
Please note that these steps do not necessarily need
to be performed in any particular order.
Alternate Data Stream Detection (NTFS Only)
One of the easiest tasks that can be performed in a
forensics environment is detecting NTFS Alternate Data
Streams.

ADS allows someone to implant information,

whether maliciously or not, into a file that cannot be
detected by normal means.

These additions do not alter the

properties of the file that is acting as the "carrier" of
these streams.

Neither the size nor the display of the

file is modified.

The information concerning the stream is

stored in the $MFT and its mirror which cannot be read
while the computer is up and running.

Students should be

instructed in the following areas:
●
●

Determining that a hard drive has been formatted using
NTFS.
Selection of readily available tools for detecting ADS
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CrucialADS
LADS
What to do if an ADS is found
■ Viewing and documenting the contents of the ADS
■
■

●

File Header/Signature Rectification
A technique commonly used to hide a file's true file
type or contents in Windows is to change a file's
extension.

Windows unfortunately reads a file's three

character extension to determine which program to use to
view/edit the file.

Simply changing this extension is

enough to confuse the operating system.

Students should

learn:
●

●

How to manually search file headers/signatures
■ Using hex editors
■ Comparing a file's header with a known good list
of file headers
■ Using the Linux command file
Automated signature rectification using main analysis
tool
File Recovery/Data Carving
Most people are under the mistaken impression that

when they delete a file that it is removed physically from
the disk.

These same people also believe that when a hard

drive or floppy disk is reformatted that all the prior
information is also gone.

In this section, the students

need to be trained in the knowledge that this simply is not
true and deleted files can be recovered in most cases.
Concepts for the students to learn:

70

●
●
●

●
●

●
●

●

What is data carving?
How data carving is useful in our investigations.
In which situations a file would not be recoverable
■ Overwriting with new files
■ Data destruction via tools created for that
purpose
■ Physical disk destruction
Recovery via Electron Microscope (and how that is
beyond the scope of the course)
Areas to look for files to recover
■ Unallocated Space
■ File Slack
■ RAM Slack
■ Host Protected Area
■ Unused Disk Space
How to extract the contents of these areas
How to carve files
■ What tools are available
■ Updating file signatures
■ How the tools work
Recovering, Restoring, and Renaming carved files
Image Processing
With image processing, the students need to learn that

all images are not what they seem.

They need to learn

about methodically performing a visual inspection of files
and what steganography is.
●
●
●

●

●
●

Topics to cover include:

Viewing and cataloging images
Determining the content of images
Steganography
■ What is steganography?
■ How is it used?
■ How steganography differs from cryptography
■ Commonly available steganography tools
Using tools to determine if files contain
steganography
■ Using the tools that create stego files
■ Stegdetect tool
■ Stegbreak tool
Extracting steganographic information
Even though steganography is commonly associated with
image files, explain how other files can contain
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steganography.

Give examples.
Keyword Searching

A fairly easy way to find information rather quickly
is to perform a keyword search.

When contracting out to a

client, the client may provide a list of keywords to search
for in the filesystem.

If not, you can easily create a

personal list of keywords on a case-by-case situation.

By

interacting with the client, you can usually determine what
information to search for.
●
●

●
●
●

Students should learn:

The purpose of keyword searching
How to create a keyword list if not provided one
■ Exact words or phrases
■ Wildcard usage
Using wildcards to search for email
What tools to use to keyword search
How to interpret results
Report Writing
Upon completion of the forensics analysis, a report

must be written detailing the findings of the examination.
Emphasis upon good grammar, clean formatting, and clear
presentation of facts and conclusions must be imparted to
the students.
●
●
●

They need to learn:

What should be included in the final report.
What should NOT be included in the final report.
Report formatting (all from [NIJ, 29-30])
■ Identity of the reporting agency.
■ Case identifier or submission number.
■ Case investigator.
■ Identity of the submitter.
■ Date of receipt.
■ Date of report.
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■

■
■

■
■
■

■

■

Descriptive list of items submitted for
examination, including serial number, make, and
model.
Identity and signature of the examiner.
Brief description of steps taken during
examination, such as string searches, graphics
image searches, and recovering erased files.
Results/conclusions.
Summary of findings
Details of findings
● Specific files related to the request.
● Other files, including deleted files, that
support the findings.
● String searches, keyword searches, and text
string searches.
● Internet-related evidence, such as Web site
traffic analysis, chat logs, cache files, email, and news group activity.
● Graphic image analysis.
● Indicators of ownership, which could include
program registration data.
● Data analysis.
● Description of relevant programs on the
examined items.
● Techniques used to hide or mask data, such as
encryption, steganography, hidden attributes,
hidden partitions, and file name anomalies.
Supporting materials
● List supporting materials that are included
with the report, such as printouts of
particular items of evidence, digital copies of
evidence, and chain of custody documentation.
Glossary

This methodology should serve the students well.

It

should be equivalent to a private forensics training
course.

The labs in the appendices should amply complement

the above methodology.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Computer Forensics is a field of Information Security
that will be necessary to study and improve for many years
to come.

Universities will need to train and prepare

graduate-level students with the necessary skills to be a
competent forensics analyst upon achievement of his or her
degree.

The most effective methods of teaching computer

forensics have been laid out in this thesis.

If

universities choose to implement the laboratory curricula
presented, it will greatly benefit students who wish to
learn computer forensics and wish to become a successful
computer forensics analyst.
In this section of the thesis, we will discuss two
major topics:

the major shortcomings of this thesis and

how this work could eventually be expanded.

Actually,

these two topics complement each other as the major
shortcomings of this thesis would be the proper avenues to
explore to expand this work.
The scope of this thesis is the greatest limitation
placed upon its writing.

When I first began researching
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this topic, I was full of ideas that I wanted to include in
my writings.

Compiling the list of the topics I wanted to

touch on would have created an outline suitable for a mass
publication literary work.

Unfortunately, I had neither

the time nor the patience to write a tome of that
magnitude.

With the help of Dr. Elmaghraby, I was able to

pare down my thoughts and ideas into a form actually
smaller that what is listed in my outline.

This trimming

and rearranging helped focus me onto hard drive and similar
media forensics.

It was at this point that I realized that

there was a glaring omission.

I had neglected to include a

section specifically dedicated to the methodology I was to
prescribe.

I originally believed it would be enough to

have a literature review and a laboratory section alone.
After much pondering, I decided a methodology section was
in order to explain why I chose to create the lab portion
as I did.

As this is the seventh instance of my thesis,

the methodology did not appear until the fifth writing.
Thus, we can begin determining how this work can be
expanded by first revisiting the thesis scope.
In shortened form, this thesis is to cover techniques
directly concerning performing a computer forensics
analysis of a hard drive or other related media.
where expansion upon this topic can begin.
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This is

The first place

where expansion can be beneficial is to focus on the
forensic examinations of specific operating systems.

Since

this thesis is for the most part operating system neutral,
the first action I would take is created three sections
dedicated solely to the three major operating systems:

the

Microsoft Windows family, the UNIX/Linux family, and the
Apple OS families (even though Apple OS X could conceivably
be placed in the UNIX/Linux family).
break down the sections into subparts.

I would then further
In the Microsoft

Windows section, I would rend it into the Windows 9x family
and the Windows NT family.

For Apple OS, it would be split

into pre-OS X and OS X families.
be tricky.

For UNIX/Linux, it would

I would have a section with generalizations of

each the commonalities between the different distributions
and another section with the portions that pertain to the
specifics of the distributions.

I would want to at least

cover AIX, HPUX, IRIX, SCO, Solaris, BSD and the Linux
distributions Red Hat, SuSE, Debian, and Slackware.
The next avenue to explore in further expanding this
thesis is live analysis.

Since this thesis focuses

exclusively on performing forensic analyses of systems that
are no longer running, branching into live analysis is
logical.

A live analysis is one in which the suspect

computer system is currently in operating mode with
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processes running.

A live analysis is rather tricky to

perform as data is changing in real time and crucial
information may be destroyed.

There are programs available

on the market to perform a live analysis, such as Guidance
Software's EnCase Enterprise Edition, but these require
installation, activation, and processes running long before
a live analysis is performed.
A third avenue to explore is network forensics.
Network forensics is the capture, recording, and analysis
of network events in order to discover the source of
security attacks or other problem incidents
[SearchSecurity].

The requirements for storage of this

information is astronomical given the speed and volume of
data that flows through the Internet or common networks.
Some of this may be accomplished by creating a honeypot for
attack, but usually not enough information is gathered from
one machine.

Therefore, the time and effort involved can

outweigh the benefits.

But, this is still a viable topic

to be examined.
Finally, the field of software forensics is another
avenue in which to explore expanding this thesis.

Although

a distinct tangent from the scope of the thesis, it still
merits mentioning here.

The goal of software forensics is

not to examine a system to determine if crimes have been
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committed or gather information for a legal brief; it is to
examine a piece of malware and determine who wrote the
software in an attempt to capture them.

You can learn how

the malware was written, how it works, its purpose, and
hopefully the author by using established software
forensics methods.
I believe these topics are good starting points for
expansion upon this thesis.
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APPENDIX A:
PREFACE:

LABORATORY PRAXIS

Laboratory Equipment Requirements

When creating a laboratory to perform a forensic
analysis of a computer, two major factors come into play.
The first factor is the money involved to purchase the
needed equipment and software; the second is the actual
computer and software needed to be purchased.

This section

will focus on creating a small forensics lab on a minimal
budget that will allow one to complete the following lab
exercises and be a good entry-level setup if the student
decides to continue into a career as an independent
consultant.
The money factor will greatly influence the choice of
equipment purchased but should not affect the choice of
software purchased.

Since we should attempt to have

standardized software, it will be assumed that we will need
at least one primary forensics software package to perform
standard analysis functions and one to perform the task of
data carving.

For those on a very tight budget, I

recommend purchasing Access Data's Forensic Toolkit®
(US$1095 at time of writing) to perform the standard
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analysis functions and the DataLifter® File Extractor Pro
(US$155 at time of writing) to perform data carving
functions.

FEPro is much more robust and allows for

creation of custom signatures to carve with than the builtin data carving tool of Forensic Toolkit®.

For those with

a larger budget, I recommend purchasing Guidance Software's
EnCase® Forensic Edition (Price unknown at the time due to
the company not publishing prices anymore.

Assumed to be

in the US$2500-$3000 range per personal license.) along
with the DataLifter® Forensicware SolutionsTM (US$335 at
time of writing) and Paraben's P2 Power Pack (US$1495 at
time of writing) which contains a whole host of tools that
makes an investigation easier such as encryption cracking
tools and chat analyzers.
As for the hardware required for a forensics analysis,
a powerful PC is necessary that has the capability to
interface with the three major types of hard drives (SATA,
SCSI, and IDE) with write-blocking capability.

Also

necessary is the ability to read DVD/CD discs, floppy
disks, and various flash media and thumb drives.

The

necessity to read these media types in a read-only manner
cannot be stated enough.

Therefore, the options are

limited to either purchasing a computer forensics specific
machine or purpose-building one yourself.
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For off-the-

shelf machines, there are at least three manufacturers
building forensics-specific machines.

One is Forensic

Computer (http://www.forensic-computers.com) of Glen Lyn,
VA.

Their baseline product, the Original Forensic Tower II

(US$4990 base price at time of writing) is available as a
beginner's forensic computer.

Another company is Digital

Intelligence (http://www.digitalintelligence.com) of
Waukesha, WI.

Their baseline product, F.R.E.D. (US$5999

base price at time of writing) is also a good starter
computer.

Finally, ForensicPC (http://www.forensicpc.com)

which is a subsidiary of Axis Microsystems, Inc. of
Medford, MA offers the entry-level ForensicPC Pentium D
Tower (US$3495 base price at time of writing).
I am of the opinion that a computer that is purposebuilt may actually be more powerful than what is
commercially available for an equivalent price.

My

personal recommendations of minimum requirements would be:
●
●
●
●

●
●
●
●

AMD Opteron Dual-Core Processors (at least one,
preferably two)
2GB RAM (more is better, but Windows XP cannot address
more than 4GB)
At least 200GB internal SATA storage (for OS and tools)
Removable drive bays to house forensic copies of
evidentiary hard drives for examination purposes
(writable for cloning, read-only for investigation)
Hardware write-blockers capable of interfacing with
SATA, SCSI, and IDE
DVD/RW drive for saving information
DVD-ROM drive for accessing information on DVD/CD discs
Floppy Drive

85

●
●
●
●

PCMCIA/Media Card reader (read-only)
Plenty of USB 2.0 and Firewire ports
Sound card
Windows-based Operating System (Linux as an additive
option)

I recommend the AMD processors versus the Intel processors
by personal choice.

It is my opinion that the AMD

processors are better on the whole.

I shall attempt to

clarify my opinion with the following analogy from the
automotive world:

the Intel processors have more

horsepower whereas the AMD processors have more torque.
It's great to go fast (horsepower) but fast is not a big
help when severe number-crunching is necessary (torque) and
your forensics machine needs all available power when
performing an analysis.

Therefore, I would choose AMD

products over Intel.
Everything written in this section prior has been
mostly my personal opinion.

The following laboratory

exercises have been written to make use of the equipment
already available to the student at the university.

The

University of Louisville is in possession of an older-model
F.R.E.D. unit from Digital Intelligence.
equipped with

This unit is

Guidance Software's EnCase® Forensic

Edition, Digital Intelligence's DriveSpy, Image, PDWipe,
PDBlock, and PART, and
SolutionsTM.

DataLifter® Forensicware

Another important tool included with FRED is
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FTK Imager.
of labs.

It will be very necessary in the first section

Other software that may be used will be outlined

in the labs with locations on the Internet where students
may download them as necessary.

Forensic Imaging Lab
Forensic Sanitizing of Target Media
Purpose:
To acquaint students with the rudimentary forensic task of
wiping media.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Forensically sanitize media
● Familiarize themselves with F.R.E.D.
Key Concepts:
● Forensic Sanitizing
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● Floppy Disk (DSHD) or blank CD-ROM
Introduction:
Our first task before ever entertaining the thought of
creating a forensically sound image is to ensure the media
onto which we place an image or perform a bit-stream
duplication has been made forensically clean. I prefer
using new media every time, but for our purposes and for
training purposes we need to learn how to sanitize target
media. To do so, we need to make our hard drives conform
to the U.S. Department of Defense Standard 5220.22-M/NISPOM
8-306. To roughly paraphrase this standard, all target
media must have all addressable locations overwritten with
a character (usually 0x01), its complement (usually 0x10),
and then a random character. This overwrite result must
then be verified. EnCase makes this very easy for us.
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However, I want us to have the capability to use non-GUI,
non-Guidance Software tools. After some research, I have
found what seems to be a decent tool called Darik's Boot
and Nuke (DBAN) at http://dban.sourceforge.net. Although
it claims to be able to wipe in accordance with the DOD
specifications, it cannot wipe the Host Protected Area
(HPA) of a disk. But, it seems to be a good tool and I
have read many good reviews of it. Therefore, we will use
it in this lab.
Methodology:
Instructions for wiping HDD to DOD specifications using
EnCase:
1. When the power to F.R.E.D. is turned OFF, replace the
HDD drive tray marked "Secondary IDE" with another
drive tray containing your target hard drive (THD)
which you wish to wipe.
2. Power up F.R.E.D. and login to Windows XP.
3. Start EnCase by double-clicking the EnCase icon on the
desktop. Please make sure the red key-fob is still
plugged into a USB port at the rear of the machine.
It will be lit-up if so. EnCase will not work
properly without the key-fob.
4. Click on Tools -> Wipe Drive
5. Click in the box next to #1 Local Drives (which places
a check mark in it). This will instruct EnCase to
only search local devices and not any you may have
connected to through a crossover cable or other
network device. Click Next. It will then search
F.R.E.D. for his local devices.
6. In the Choose Devices window, you will find many
choices of drives and/or devices to choose. EnCase
has icons for partitions and icons for entire physical
disks. The icons for partitions are represented by a
"clip art" representation of a hard drive. THIS IS
NOT WHAT WE WANT. We do not want to destroy the
contents of a partition; we want to wipe an entire
physical medium. The icon for a physical device could
possibly be described as a yellow disk platter with a
read/write head attached. The one we are looking for
is usually #11 in the list. It should show the hard
disk's label, number of sectors, and size. We want to
make sure we do not choose incorrectly, so please make
sure you are choosing the correct one. Know in
advance the size of the drive you are wiping. This
helps a lot and can keep you from wiping a device you
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did not intend to. When you have made the decision of
which device to wipe, click on the box next to the
device (which places a check mark in it) and click
Next.
7. The choice of Verify Wiped Sectors is already chosen
for us. Please do not uncheck it. EnCase then asks
you to enter a hex character for it to write to the
disk. 0x00 is the default. Change the value to 0x01.
Click Finish.
8. At this point, a new window will pop up and ask
(roughly) if you are sure you wish to wipe this disk.
You are then required to type the word "Yes" in the
provided box. Do so now and click OK.
9. Depending on the rotational speed of the THD, this
process will take anywhere from 5-15 minutes per
gigabyte of hard drive space you are wiping and
verifying. Since this is a labor intensive process,
you may want to go do something else at this point.
10.Success! When finished, you should be presented with
a window showing results and verification. If you
were doing this for a case, you would click in the box
to note the information for the case.
11.Now, repeat steps 4-10 but substitute a value of 0x10
for 0x01 in step seven.
12.Now, repeat steps 4-10 again but substitute a random
hex value in step seven.
13.When Step 12 is completed, you have successfully
completed three of the seven passes required to make a
medium security-level wipe in accordance with DOD
specifications. I will not torture you by requiring
you to do seven passes. You have successfully
completed Task #1 when you verify the disk is empty.
Instructions for wiping HDD to DOD specifications using
DBAN:
To use DBAN, you do not need to use F.R.E.D. I recommend
just using one of the three available machines in the lab
with the drive trays in them.
1. Install THD in one of the removable drive trays of the
available machines. I have left a screwdriver set in
the lab for this purpose. You do not need to screw
the THD into place, but you may need to remove a hard
drive from the tray that is screwed in place.
2. Place THD tray into top slot and power on machine. As
the machine is booting, insert floppy or CD-R
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containing DBAN-1.0.6 to allow the computer to boot
from disk. If you boot from CD, you will need a
formatted floppy in the drive to store the
verification file it will output when finished.
3. When the initial DBAN boot screen appears, just press
the Enter key and allow it to commence booting.
4. Once booting has completed, you will be presented with
the DBAN screen (which is white text on a blue
background if you get something else for some unknown
reason). Here is where you will make your choices for
wiping the drive.
5. Type the M key to choose the method of wiping. You
will be presented the possibilities. Use the arrow
keys or the J and K keys to move the arrow next to DoD
5220-22.M and press the Enter key. This chooses our
DoD standard.
6. Type the V key to choose the method of verification.
The default choice should be Verify Last Pass. This
is the choice we want as it will determine if the disk
is clean only after the seventh pass, not after each
pass. Press the Enter key.
7. Press the Space Bar. This selects which disk we
choose to wipe. If you have multiple disks showing on
the screen, use the arrow keys or the J and K keys to
move the arrow next to the disk you choose to wipe and
then press the space bar.
8. Press the F10 key. This begins the process of wiping
the drive (without delay or verification as EnCase
does.
9. Depending on the rotational speed and seek time of the
THD, this process can last up to many hours (It took
me slightly over two hours to wipe a 3GB HDD that I
believe to be only 4200RPM). As with the EnCase
instructions, you may want to find something else to
do during this time.
10.Success! You will be presented with a finishing
screen (white text on black background) asking you to
insert a floppy disk to record log files and
verification information. You will need a blank, DOS
formatted disk for this. The files will be in .tgz
format (compressed tarball). In Windows, you can use
a program like WinRAR to unpack these files. In
Linux, you can just use the built-in command tar -zxvf
with the package name.
You will need to turn in a print out of the verification
logs from DBAN for part of your lab grade.
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WARNING: There is a small but forgivable problem with
DBAN. After writing the log files, it goes into a
continuous loop to rewrite them. Just hit the reset button
on the computer or just power off.
Hashing Images and Drives
Creating Bit-Stream Duplicates (The Quick and Dirty Method)
Creating Forensic Images
Purpose:
To acquaint students with the rudimentary forensic tasks of
hashing and imaging.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Compute MD5 and/or SHA-1 sums of images
● Create a forensic boot floppy
● Create duplicates using Symantec Ghost
● Create images using FTK Imager
● Create images using Paraben Forensic Replicator

Key Concepts:
● Hashing Images and Drives
● Creating Duplicates
● Creating Images
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● Floppy Disk (DSHD)

Introduction:
Acquiring forensically sound images or duplicates of a
hard drive is one of the most crucial tasks an forensic
analyst must complete. If the information on the Source
Hard Drive (henceforth known as SHD) gets changed by one
bit, it can throw an entire investigation into jeopardy.
This is sometimes known as having “dirty information” or
“dirty data” and a good defense attorney will have this
evidence excluded from any legal action. Therefore, you
must make sure the information you are about to copy has
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not been tampered with since it became a possession of the
authorities. Chain of Custody documentation is of utmost
importance in this matter.
The question remains, how can we make a forensic image
or duplicate of a SHD? Many methods exist but there are
generally two major categories: Hardware-based
imaging/duplicating and Software-based imaging/duplicating.
Hardware-based imaging/duplication is performed by products
such as the ICS Solo-3 family of products, Logicube
Forensic MD5, and Digital Intelligence HardCopy. These
products can create duplicates rather rapidly and will
print out (you usually provide the portable printer) hash
values and other information about the SHD and the Target
Hard Drive (henceforth known as THD). These products make
the process very easy and efficient, but they usually cost
$1000 or more. Most startup forensic analysts cannot
afford this luxury so they rely on the other category,
Software-based imaging/duplication. This is the category
we will focus on in this lab. In this lab, we will
practice hashing SHDs with commercially available products.
We will also do a quick and dirty software-based
duplication onto forensically clean THDs. Finally, we will
create forensic images using commercially available
products.
NOTICE: Make sure you have forensically wiped the THD you
plan on using for Section C of this lab. Refer to part (i)
for methodology. Also make sure the THD is the same size
or larger than the SHD.
Methodology:
A. How to Hash a Hard Drive Using EnCase:
1. With F.R.E.D. powered off, place the SHD into an empty
drive tray, replace the cover, and insert into
SCSIBlock tray. Please make sure the SHD jumper is
set to Cable Select or Master.
2. Power on F.R.E.D.
3. Allow Windows XP to boot and login by providing the
CECS 694 account password.
4. Double-click on the EnCase icon on the desktop to
start the program.
5. Click the NEW button below the File menu. EnCase
requires you to create a new case to acquire a drive.
We really don't need to do this at this point, but we
must. So when information concerning Case Number,
Examiner Name, etc. appear, just press Enter or click
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FINISH. I have some defaults listed that will meet
our purposes.
6. Click File --> Add Device. This allows us to choose
which hard drive we want to hash.
7. In the Add Device window, click in the checkbox next
to Local Drives (checkbox #1) and click NEXT. This
process takes a few minutes as EnCase searches for all
devices attached to F.R.E.D.
8. In the Choose Devices window, click in the checkbox
next to the Physical Drive representing our SHD
(usually Physical Drive #3; usually checkbox #16).
Click NEXT.
9. In the Preview Devices window, we are to double check
that this truly is the drive we want to acquire. If
so, click FINISH or press Enter. It is now acquiring
the drive.
10.We are now back to our original EnCase screen. You
will now see that our SHD is now listed below Case 1
in the left hand window. Click in the box next to our
SHD in this window. DO NOT click in the pentagon next
to the box. It has a different meaning. We do not
want this.
11.Notice how the screen has changed a bit. This is just
a text dump of the SHD contents. Now click Edit -->
Hash. It will ask for start and end sectors. The
default is the entire drive. This is what we want.
Click OK or press Enter. This begins the hashing
process. It should take less than ten minutes for
this process to finish.
12.SUCCESS! You now have an output of the hashing in a
conclusion window. Copy and paste all this information
into some sort of text file and save it into the
folder you have created for your team on the Q: drive
and name it EnCaseHash.
B. How to Hash a Hard Drive Using Paraben Forensic
Replicator:
1. Download and install Paraben Forensic Replicator demo
version (http://www.parabenforensics.com/programs/replicatordemo.exe) if not
already installed.
2. With F.R.E.D. powered off, place the SHD into an empty
drive tray, replace the cover, and insert into
SCSIBlock tray. Please make sure the SHD jumper is
set to Cable Select or Master.
3. Power on F.R.E.D.
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4. Allow Windows XP to boot and login by providing the
CECS 694 account password.
5. Double-click on the Forensic Replicator icon on the
desktop to start the program.
6. Click File --> Calculate Checksum of Physical Drive.
7. You are presented with a new window which is the
introductory window for checksum calculation. Click
NEXT.
8. We are now shown a scroll pane listing all physical
drives the software finds (it is much quicker than
EnCase). Choose the disk representing the SHD
(usually Disk #3). Ensure that both checkboxes remain
checked. Click NEXT.
9. In the next window, we are asked if we wish to
calculate a hash on the entire physical drive or just
a few sectors. The default choice is Process the full
physical drive. This is what we want. Click NEXT.
10.The Report Wizard window is next. We want to choose
HTML File as our output and click the first three
checkboxes to be placed in out output. Click FINISH.
11.We are now confronted with a SAVE dialog. Name the
file PFRHash and save it in the folder you have
created for your team on the Q: drive. Click SAVE or
press Enter.
12.This begins the hashing process. It should take less
than ten minutes to perform.
13.SUCCESS! A dialog box appears on the screen
containing the information saved in our HTML file.
C. A Quick and Dirty Method to Create a Forensic Duplicate
Using Symantec Ghost:
I call this a Quick and Dirty Method because it is the poor
person's imaging with a minimum of programs and money. The
longest part is creating the forensic boot floppy. Once
done, you can use the Digital Intelligence program Image to
create an executable image of the disk for future
duplicates. Unfortunately, this imaging method will not
stand up in court, but in internal company investigations,
it should work. The hash value of the drive will be
different of the THD than the SHD unless you have the exact
same model THD as SHD with the exact same specifications.
This does not really matter in internal investigations.
However, you may want to make other images using other
programs if the case could generate legal action of some
sort.
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1. Power on F.R.E.D. At the boot menu screen, use the
arrow keys to choose MS-DOS 6.22 and press the Enter
key when highlighted.
2. You will be presented with many different loading
options and you can just allow the default to load.
You will be asked approximately four further loading
questions. You can choose to answer No to all of them
or allow the defaults to occur when the choices time
out.
3. Now you are presented with a C:\> prompt. Insert a
DSHD (1.44MB) floppy disk into the A: drive. At the
prompt, type format a:/s.
4. The operating system will ask you to insert a disk
into the A: drive. Press the Enter key. When it is
finished formatting, give the disk the volume name of
4N6BOOT. You do not want to format another.
5. Now the fun begins. Switch to the A: drive by typing
A: at the C:\> prompt and press Enter.
6. At the A:\> prompt, type ATTRIB -R -H -S *.* and press
Enter. This removes read-only attributes, hidden
attributes, and system attributes from all files. This
is necessary for the next step.
7. Type dir at the prompt to show the files on the floppy
disk. Remove the drvspace.bin file typing DEL
DRVSPACE.BIN. This file is very bad! It must go and
sit in the penalty box where it will feel shame. This
file attempts to write to hard drives, so we do not
want it.
8. You now need to copy two programs, Symantec Ghost and
Digital Intelligence's PDBlock to the floppy. At the
A:\> prompt, type COPY C:\GHOST\GHOST.EXE . and press
Enter (notice the dot after the space after EXE as it
is crucial it is there). When that process is
finished, type COPY C:\DIGINTEL\PDBLOCK.EXE . (again
notice the dot). These two commands will copy the
files you need onto the disk.
9. You now need to create a file on the floppy called
config.sys by typing EDIT A:\CONFIG.SYS (yes, I know
it's redundant but you can never be too sure) at the
A:\> prompt. This will open a nice blue screen for
you to type in. Add this singular line: LASTDRIVE=Z
and save and exit the file. The purpose of this is to
not confuse DOS if it finds a lot of devices.
10.Now you need to create another file on the floppy
called autoexec.bat by typing at the prompt EDIT
A:\AUTOEXEC.BAT . This is a file that DOS reads in
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the booting process to run programs on startup. You
need to make two entries. On the first line, type
A:\PDBLOCK.EXE 0 /NOMSG /NOBELL . This command will
activate the PDBlock program which is a software write
blocker. The option 0 (zero) will protect only the
first drive in the system. The option /nomsg will not
pop up a message on the screen every time a write is
blocked. The option /nobell will not sound the
annoying little tone continuously when a write is
blocked. The second entry in autoexec.bat should be
A:\GHOST.EXE -IR . This automatically starts Ghost
for us with the proper switch to make a forensic copy.
Save and exit the file.
11.You must now wipe all free space on the floppy to make
sure nothing can contaminate your system. To do this,
switch back the the C: drive by typing C: at the A:\>
prompt and press Enter. At the C:\> prompt, type
DRIVESPY and press enter. DriveSpy is a forensics
program from Digital Intelligence that has many
purposes including wiping disks.
12.When DriveSpy starts, it will give you a listing of
hard drives and their associated information on the
screen, as well as a SYS> prompt. This is the first
DriveSpy prompt. Type DA and press Enter to switch to
the floppy drive. You are now presented a listing of
the partitions on the A: drive. At the DA> prompt,
type P1 and press Enter. This will allow you to
access the information stored on the floppy.
13.You are presented with information concerning what is
stored on the disk and a new DAP1:\> prompt (DAP1
stands for Drive A Partition 1). At this prompt type
WIPE /FREE and press Enter. This will allow you to
wipe the unallocated areas of the disk. DriveSpy will
ask you if you are positive you want to do this. Type
Y and the program begins.
14.When it is finished, DriveSpy will return to the
DAP1:\> prompt. Type EXIT here and press Enter. You
have exited DriveSpy and are back to your C:\> prompt.
15.SUCCESS! You have you floppy disk ready to run an
image.
16.To create an image, connect the SHD to the IDE0 cable
in a computer. Make sure the jumper is set to Master.
Connect a FORENSICALLY CLEAN THD to the IDE1 cable in
the same machine. Make sure the jumper on the THD is
also set to Master.
17.Power on the computer after placing your forensic boot
floppy in the drive.
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18.Sit back and watch. Wait for Ghost to begin. Press
Enter when prompted with OK buttons from Ghost. It is
just complaining like most Symantec products do.
19.You should now see the Ghost main screen. Press the
right arrow twice (to choose Disk-to-Disk imaging) and
press Enter.
20.You should see the SHD listed as Drive 0 and the THD
listed as Drive 1. You need to choose the SHD as the
drive to image from (it is the default) by pressing
Enter.
21.You need to choose the THD as the drive to image to
(it is the default) by pressing Enter.
22.A new screen listing the choices you have made is now
showing. Press Enter.
23.Ghost will ask you if you are sure you want to do
this. Press the left arrow to our affirmation of
starting and press Enter. The process begins.
24.When Ghost is finished, it will ask you if you want to
reboot or not. We don't want to reboot, so choose not
to. Press the down arrow key until Quit is
highlighted and press Enter. You are now down. Power
off the machine.
25.To prove your imaging worked, place the THD into an
empty drive tray and WITH F.R.E.D. POWERED OFF slide
the drive into the SCSIBlock drive bay.
26.Power on F.R.E.D. If you see a new drive, SUCCESS! If
not, retrace your steps to find what you did
incorrectly.
D.

How to Create a Forensic Image Using FTK Imager:
1. With F.R.E.D. powered off, place the SHD into an empty
drive tray, replace the cover, and insert into
SCSIBlock tray. Please make sure the SHD jumper is
set to Cable Select or Master.
2. Power on F.R.E.D.
3. Allow Windows XP to boot and login by providing the
CECS 694 account password.
4. Click Start --> Programs --> Forensic Tools (Demos)
--> Access Data --> Forensic Toolkit --> FTK Imager
5. In FTK Imager, Click File --> Image Drive OR you can
press Ctrl+I on the keyboard.
6. In the new pop-up window, click the radio button next
to the work Physical. This should change the values
in the drop-down list. From the drop-down list,
choose Physical Drive 3 and click OK.
7. You are now presented the Export Disk Image window.
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From the drop-down list, there are three choices. Raw
uncompressed (dd) format is a straight rip using the dd
tool commonly found in X operating systems. SMART
(ew-compressed) is for creating an image for the SMART
for Linux forensics tool created by ASR Data
(www.asrdata.com/SMART). The .E01 Image type is the
native image type of EnCase. This is the selection we
wish to make (.E01). Click NEXT.
8. You are next given the E01 Image options window. In
the Examiner Name text field, enter both students
names. In the Case Number text field, enter CECS 694
Lab 2. In the Notes text field, enter the value
“Ripped using FTK Imager.” You may leave the Evidence
Number and Unique Description text fields blank.
Click NEXT.
9. Now, the Image Destination window appears. Change the
destination to be the folder you created for your team
on the Q: drive and change the filename to be FTK.
Make sure the checkbox next to Perform an MD5 hash of
the image remains checked. Click NEXT.
10.In the Image Segment Size window, click the radio
button next to Custom MB and a slider bar appears.
Drag the slider full right until the value under the
Segment Info heading is 1.0GB. Click NEXT.
11.If the Summary window values are what you want them to
be, click FINISH. If not, click BACK to make changes
or click CANCEL to start again.
12.The disk is now being exported. It should not take
more than ten minutes.
13.SUCCESS! You should have three files from the FTK
Imager in your folder: FTK.E01, FTK.E02, and FTK.txt.
E. How to Create a Forensic Image Using Paraben Forensic
Replicator:
1. With F.R.E.D. powered off, place the SHD into an empty
drive tray, replace the cover, and insert into
SCSIBlock tray. Please make sure the SHD jumper is
set to Cable Select or Master.
2. Power on F.R.E.D.
3. Allow Windows XP to boot and login by providing the
CECS 694 account password.
4. Double-click on the Forensic Replicator icon on the
desktop.
5. In the Paraben Forensic Replicator, click File -->
Create Physical drive image...
6. You are now presented with the Creating Physical drive
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image wizard which will help walk you through creating
an image. Click NEXT.
7. In the Physical drive scroll box, click on the entry
for the 4210920 KB - WDC AC14 300R entry (usually Disk
3). Make sure the two checkboxes below our selection
remain checked. Click NEXT.
8. You will now be prompted to enter a location and name
for your image file. Choose the folder you created for
your team on the Q: drive and name the image file PFR.
Make sure you check the checkbox for Save in raw
format. Click NEXT.
9. The next window is the Report Wizard window. We want
our report output to be nice and easy to read, so
please click the radio button next to HTML File and
check the first three checkboxes below. These
checkboxes will place Image Information, Time and Date
of Acquisition, and Export Partition Structure
information in the report. Click FINISH. You will
then need to tell the program where to save your
report. Save it in the same directory as the image
you are creating.
10.The disk is now being exported. It should not take
more than ten minutes.
11.SUCCESS! You will be presented with a pop-up window
that lets you know that the image has been created
successfully. This window also contains data
verification information. Click OK and you are
finished. You should have two files in your team
directory, PFR.PFR and PFR.html.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Restore the dd image LabAiiImage.1
to a hard drive
preferably 4GB in size but you may substitute one that
is larger. Please make sure it has been forensically
sanitized in advance of restoring the image.
Introductory Investigative Techniques
Finding the Obvious
Purpose:
To acquaint students with the basic skills of forensic
analysis and build investigative skills.
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Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Pursue a methodical searching of a hard drive
● Find obvious evidence on a hard drive
Key Concepts:
● Basic forensic analysis
● Finding obvious information
● Building investigative skills
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● Floppy Disk (DSHD) from Project A(ii)
Introduction:
One of the great mistakes many novice computer
forensics analysts make is to jump right into using
forensic analysis tools and miss the overall picture
created by the suspect computer's working environment.
This is why I propose making at bare minimum two working
copies of each suspect media (more specifically, the hard
drives). One is for viewing the media out of context in a
forensic environment. The other is to view the media in
the context of a working environment. Many clues and
pieces of evidence can be easily gathered just by booting
up a forensic copy of the suspect system. This allows the
investigator to see the system as the user would, which can
lead to surprising results.
I believe it to be very necessary to view the suspect
media in-context before viewing it in a forensic
environment. This allows us to determine many things such
as if the suspect media is contaminated with malware that
could have possibly caused our current investigation (such
as spyware that downloads child pornography to a victim's
machine), if the perpetrator attempted to destroy evidence,
if electronic burglary tools are present and have been used
illegally, if pirated software is installed or stored on a
system, or if there are any blatant violations of company
code of conduct or acceptable use policies in a corporate
situation. Many of these may not be easily seen in a
forensic environment. Whereas in an out-of-context
environment a file or set of files may look suspicious, in
context they could be perfectly normal and acceptable.
This project, unlike previous projects, will focus
exclusively on viewing a suspect hard drive in a working
computer context. Therefore, neither F.R.E.D. nor any
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forensic tools may be used for this project. This will
allow you to build your investigative skills and not have
you rely on software that cannot think logically for
itself. I trust that you will accomplish this task in a
methodical, efficient, and timely manner and you will have
a respect for not relying solely on a computer to do your
work for you.
NOTICE: Make sure you have forensically wiped the THD you
plan on using for this lab. Refer to Lab A(i) for
methodology. Also make sure the THD is the same size or
larger than the SHD.
Methodology:
In-context Investigation Skills (aka Finding the Obvious):
1. Create a duplicate of the Source Hard Drive (SHD) using
the Quick and Dirty Method from the previous project. See
Project A(ii) for methodology. The only difference is we
want to use the three machines with removable drive bays
instead of the tear-down machine. Remove SHD and put it
back where it belongs.
2. Place THD in the top bay of one of the computers and
boot it. The image was created on this machine so there
should be no problems with it working correctly.
3. Complete the scenario below and answer the questions to
the fullest extent. You will be graded in accordance of
the evidentiary material you find and the completion of the
questions.
Project Scenario:
Your consulting firm, Acme Consulting, has been contacted
by Thurdsten Industries concerning a problem they are
having with an employee of theirs...a Mr. William R.
Rubeck. It seems Mr. Rubeck has possibly been violating
the company's written policy of acceptable use of its
computer systems. Unfortunately, Mr. Rubeck has placed
some sort of password protection scheme into the BIOS of
his corporate computer that will not allow it to boot
without the correct password. This is why your team has
been brought in. Your company has been tasked with seizing
Mr. Rubeck's hard drive and imaging it for forensic
analysis during non-business hours. Thurdsten Industries
is so confident of the guilt of Mr. Rubeck that they have
not authorized a full forensics analysis. They only want
your company to produce any information that is visible in
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a non-forensic environment so they can justify terminating
the suspect's employment.
Assumptions: You are to assume that the seizing and
imaging of the suspect drive has been accomplished by other
members of the team. You are also to assume that you have
been presented with a forensic copy of the suspect hard
drive and that all chain-of-custody forms have been
appropriately begun and/or completed. You are also to
assume the basic components of a corporate acceptable use
policy for computers (use your best judgment).

Questions to Answer:
1. Is there sufficient evidence to terminate the
employment of Mr. Rubeck? If so, please list all pieces of
evidence and their location in the filesystem (path from
filesystem root).
2. Is there sufficient evidence to launch a criminal
complaint against Mr. Rubeck and have ordered a full
forensic examination of his hard drive? If so, please list
all pieces of evidence, their location in the filesystem,
and why you believe a criminal complaint need be sworn
against Mr. Rubeck.
Answers to Questions:
1. Yes. Students are to list the paths and find the
following:
● Pornographic images
● Pornographic web sites visited in cache
● Evidence eliminator program
● L0phtcrack
● Hack-tool Gencontrol disguised as Google Earth
● Apache web server
● Steganography tools and someone's Master's Thesis on
steganography
● BitTorrent client
Let them know that short-hand is acceptable when referring
to My Documents (no need for the full path in that case).
Value of this question: 80 points
2. Yes. In building upon the students learning
investigative techniques, they should have discovered not
only the steganography tools but a program known as Easy
Office. In the mailer program of Easy Office, a sent email
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should be found addressed to the organization known as
NAMBLA (if the students do not know what this organization
is, they may use their own time to look it up). This email
lets the webmaster know that the images are up on the
suspect's web server. Upon cursory glance, the images
appear to be legitimate pictures of soccer players. But
using the students' new-found investigatory powers, they
should recognize that the combination of steganography
tools, seemingly legitimate images, and NAMBLA is not good.
The student should then use to steganography tools to
attempt to extract other files from the images on the
Apache server. The students should be able to extract from
each image of a soccer player a file containing child
pornography. Unacceptable: Even though some of the
pornographic images found may have titles leading one to
believe that the subject is under age, they are not the
child pornography files they are supposed to find and no
points are to be awarded if they do not find the hidden
images. Value of this question: 20 points
NOTE: NO ACTUAL PORNOGRAPHIC IMAGES OR CHILD PORNOGRAPY IS
USED IN THIS LAB. THEY ARE MERELY IMAGES OF STICK FIGURES
WITH THE WORDS “PORNOGRAPHY” OR “KIDDIE PORN”.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Restore the dd image LabBImage.1 to a hard drive
preferably 4GB in size but you may substitute one that
is larger. Please make sure it has been forensically
sanitized in advance of restoring the image.
● Grade students submissions and submit grades to
professor.
Intermediate Investigative Techniques
File Header/Signature Rectification
Purpose:
To acquaint students with the intermediate technique of
file header/signature rectification.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Understand what file signatures are and their
importance to describing a file.
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●
●

Be able to identify a file type by its signature.
Be able to rectify a file by its signature.

Key Concepts:
● Using hex editors
● Using EnCase to rectify file signatures
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● EnCase University Edition Academic Training CD
● A suitable Windows-based hex editor (UltraEdit32 is
recommended)
Introduction:
A common way people try to hide files in any operating
system (and especially in Microsoft variants) is to change
the extension of a file in the hopes that anyone looking
for specific information will overlook it. As most of you
should know, Windows is heavily reliant upon a file's three
character extension to determine what type of file it is
and with what program to access the file. Fortunately for
us, this does not actually change what type of file it
really is; it only obscures its true identity to the naked
eye.
The question we then need to answer is how we go about
finding which files have their extensions changed or
obfuscated in an attempt to hide the true contents of a
file. This is completely different from steganography,
which is hiding information or a file inside of another
file. This is just an attempt to mask a file of one data
type as a file of another data type.
UNIX/Linux has a great utility built in that allows you
to very quickly determine what is the data type of a file.
This utility is file. In X-based operating systems, a
file's extension is not necessary for the kernel to
determine what type of file it is and what program to use
to access it. Therefore, you find many files in these OSes
that have no extension. The kernel reads the inodes where
a file's information is stored and determines the type of
file. The file utility is very easy to use: file
<filename>.
Unfortunately, Windows does not have a utility such as
this built-in. We must find another method to determine if
a file is legitimate or not. There are two major avenues
we can use to approach this. The first method is to

104

manually determine the file type and rectify the extension
(in Windows) using a hex editor. The other way is to allow
a program such as EnCase to perform an automated
rectification of the files using its built in file
signature lists. For this lab, we are going to do both.
We are first going to examine the contents of a file and
specifically look for its signature. We will also learn
how easily information can be changed in a file and how
Windows can be tricked into believing a file is what it is
not. We will also learn how to use EnCase to rectify files
based upon their signatures (which should be one of the
first steps an examiner should do when using EnCase).
Methodology:
YOU WILL NOT NEED TO USE F.R.E.D. FOR THESE EXERCISES.
THEY CAN BE PERFORMED ON ANY MACHINE USING WINDOWS, A COPY
OF THE ENCASE UNIVERSITY EDITION ACADEMIC TRAINING CD, AND
A HEX EDITOR.
Hex Editor File Examination and Rectification:
1. Make sure you have a hex editor installed. I
recommend using UltraEdit32 (http://www.ultraedit.com)
if you are using Windows. It is a fine, inexpensive
program that does so much more than just hex editing
and as of the time of this writing, they have a fullversion demo free for 45 days.
2. Open MSPaint and create a file with anything in it.
3. Save this file as its default data type (.bmp) and
place it in a location that is easy to reach (such as
the Desktop).
4. Change the extension on the file from .bmp to
something else (I used .doc for this).
5. Windows will ask you if you really want to do this as
it could make the file unstable. Yes, this is what we
want.
6. Notice how Windows now changes the icon to the
datatype the system now thinks it is. Double-click the
file to open it. You should see nothing but junk (or
so it seems...).
7. Now you know how Windows relies so heavily on the
three character extension of a file. We know the file
is actually a bitmap, but Windows doesn't. This is
sufficient enough to fool Windows, but not the file
utility of Unix/Linux. Here's why:
8. Close the file and reopen it using your hex editor.
You should see something similar to this:
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9. This proves that the file actually is a bitmap. How?
Start at offset 0x00. 0x00 is 42 which corresponds to
the character B. 0x01 is 4D which corresponds to the
character M. This is the telltale sign that the file
is a bitmap. This is the file's signature. All files
have a file signature, usually within the first few
characters of a file. This is sometimes referred to
as a file header. Some files even have a file footer
as part of its signature. PDF files have an end-offile (EOF) footer as part of its signature. This is
conclusive evidence that Windows reads a file's
extension and not its signature to determine the type
of file. For a list of some common file signatures,
check out
http://www.garykessler.net/library/file_sigs.html.
10.Now, let's get a bit crazy. Change this file into a
PDF file by not only changing the extension but by
changing the signature. Don't forget to add the
appropriate footer. In your report, you will need to
turn in the hex code (appropriately cropped) of the
bitmap file you created and its true conversion to
PDF. Also turn in your results of whether or not you
got Adobe Acrobat Reader to open your converted bitmap
file.
Answers:
The bitmap file they created should look something like
this:

The bitmap modified into a PDF file should look something
like this:
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Headers

Footers

Make sure the %PDF is in the header and some variation of
.%%EOF. is in the footer.
Adobe Acrobat Reader correctly recognizes it as a PDF file
but cannot read it as the information stored within is but
junk to the program. AAR states that the PDF may have been
corrupted. If only the program knew...
File Signature Rectification Using EnCase:
Imaging having to look manually at each file on a target
system. It would take forever. This is why we have
automated tools to do this for us. Luckily, EnCase has
this function built in. If you plan on purchasing or using
a full version of EnCase, you will need to purchase a
subscription to NIST's National Software Reference Library
Special Database 28 which contains a quarterly updating of
file signatures to import and update the signatures that
come with EnCase. You can purchase them (at the time of
writing) at http://www.nist.gov/srd/nistsd28.htm.
1. Make sure you have installed the EnCase University
Edition Academic Training CD.
2. Unpack the Quantum evidence file to your Desktop or
other handy location.
3. Start EnCase by double-clicking its icon on your
Desktop.
4. Drag and drop the Quantum.E01 file into EnCase. A
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5.
6.

7.
8.

window should pop up asking you to supply the program
with case information. Do this and click Finish.
Please wait until EnCase finished verifying the image
before continuing to the next step.
Click the pentagon in the left-hand column next to
Quantum and also click in the checkbox next to
Quantum. This should show approximately 13,000 items.
To do the signature rectification: Near the top of
the screen, you should find a button that says Search
with a magnifying glass icon. Press this button. It
should pop up a Search box.
Uncheck everything except Verify File Signatures.
Click Start.
Within 30 seconds, it should show a completion box and
list for you the number of file signature mismatches.

Questions:
1. How many file signature mismatches were found?
2. A file with a .BMP extension was found to have a bad
extension. Determine what type of file EnCase found
it to be and explain why EnCase believes it to not be
a bitmap.
3. A file with a .JPG extension was found to have a bad
extension. EnCase has determined that the file is a
Multimedia file. Determine what type of file it
actually is.
Answers:
1. 151
2. It is a .JPG file. The file header contains JFIF
which is the signature for a .JPG file.
3. It is a .WAV file. The file header contains RIFF and
WAVEfmt which is the signature for a .WAV file.
To answer #2 and #3, the students should highlight the
files once found and click on HEX on the bottom section's
viewer instead of the default Picture button. This will
allow them to read the file's signature. If they want,
they can export the files themselves and use a stand-alone
hex editor to view the files.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
None really. Just make sure they have copies of what
software is needed and that they turn in the answers for
this section.
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Keyword Searching
Purpose:
To acquaint students with the intermediate skill of keyword
searching.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Completely search an image for keywords.
Key Concepts:
● Searching for keywords in files and file fragments of
evidentiary target media.
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● EnCase University Edition Academic Training CD
Introduction:
Most people would assume that keyword searching is a
basic technique. On the surface, it looks like you would
just use a text editor or word processor and click Edit -->
Find and enter the search string. It's really not THAT
easy. First, you couldn't dump the entire contents of a
hard drive into a word processor (including the unallocated
space). And second, word processor Find capabilities are
limited to a single word or phrase at any given time.
Neither of these are beneficial to us. We must have the
capability to search large volumes for lists of multiple
keywords all at once. Fortunately, most forensic
examination software have this needed capability.
What, pray tell, are the keywords we are searching for?
It changes on a case-by-case situation. The person
contracting you to perform an analysis may give you a list
of keywords to look for or they may give you the
circumstances surrounding the case and require you to come
up with a keyword list. Keywords can be names of people,
places, slang words, drugs, sports teams, etc. Virtually
anything can be a keyword. It's up to your or your client
to determine what to look for. This requires you to stay
in contact with the stakeholders in the examination as
requirements and keywords are susceptible to change.
In this lab, we have the choice of using two different
programs that we have readily available. We can use
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Digital Intelligence's DriveSpy to perform keyword searches
or we can use EnCase. Since DriveSpy will only work on FAT
filesystems and is purely CUI-based, we will opt to use
EnCase.
Methodology:
1. Start EnCase by double-clicking its icon on your
Desktop.
2. Drag and drop the Quantum.E01 file into EnCase. A
window should pop up asking you to supply the program
with case information. Do this and click Finish.
Please wait until EnCase finished verifying the image
before continuing to the next step.
3. Click the pentagon in the left-hand column next to
Quantum and also click in the checkbox next to
Quantum. This should show approximately 13,000 items.
4. Click View --> Keywords. This will show you the
default list of keywords. We want to add to this.
5. In the blank area of the top-right column, right-click
and select Add Keyword List. A new pop-up window
should appear.
6. In the left hand column, add fifteen or so keywords
you want to search for concerning the following themes
(the longer the list, the longer the search time):
● Drugs (specifically slang terms for Kentucky's most
well-known export and paraphernalia)
● Bombs and Explosives
● Cellular Phones
● Satan Worship
● Hacking
7. Make sure to check Unicode as one of the choices as
NTFS and Unix/Linux systems use Unicode as opposed to
ASCII for text. Click OK.
8. After you have clicked OK, you will notice new
keywords in the list. Make sure you checkmark the
boxes next to each keyword before you search.
9. Near the top of the screen, you should find a button
that says Search with a magnifying glass icon. Press
this button. It should pop up a Search box.
10.This time, we want to uncheck Verify File Signatures
and check Search Each File for Keywords, Search File
Slack, and Undelete Files Before Searching. EnCase
should tell you that you have 16 or more keywords.
This is because we are including searching for email
and web addresses. Click Start and wait for the
onslaught.
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11.To keep track of what you are finding, click View -->
Search Hits. You will need to click on Refresh near
the top of the screen to update the findings as the
search progresses. A running total of how many keyword
search hits is in the far lower right-hand corner of
the program. It also estimates how much longer the
search will take.
12.You will need to turn in a list of the terms you
searched for, the total number of search hits and the
number of search hits for each keyword searched.
Answers:
The answers vary by the keyword list.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
Make sure each student submits approximately 15 or more
keywords, the total number of search hits, and the number
of search hits for each keyword in the list.
Advanced Investigative Techniques
Data Carving
Purpose:
To acquaint students with the advanced technique of data
carving.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Understand the concept of data carving
● Successfully data carve a suspect hard drive
Key Concepts:
● Data carving
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● None
Introduction:
Most people are under the impression that when they
delete/remove a file from a computer that the file is gone
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and no trace of it exists. Most people also believe that
when they reformat a computer's hard drive that all
information on it has disappeared permanently.
Unfortunately, this is not true in either case. When
someone deletes a file, the information of the file is
still physically left on disk. The change that most
operating systems make is to remove the entry from the list
of files (FAT or $MFT in Windows, Inode list for X-based
operating systems). All this does is remove the pointers
to the file's physical location and the OS marks the
clusters as free to be used again. The original file on
disk is not physically gone until the clusters where it
resides is rewritten. This can be done eventually (and
automatically) by the operating system when it reallocates
the space for other information or a person can use any
number of commercially available products to write
information onto these clusters in an attempt to destroy
the information. From experience, not all of these
products do as well as they claim. Many still leave large
amounts of information on the disk.
There is good news, though. We can successfully recover
most of the deleted information using a technique called
data carving. In Lab C, you were introduced to the concept
of file signatures. These are the way that operating
systems are supposed to be able to identify what a file's
data type is and choose the appropriate program to open the
file with. You also learned that Microsoft operating
systems rarely follow this method and prefer to look at a
file's extension to determine what type of file it is. In
this lab, file signatures will be used to identify a file
that has been deleted and hopefully recover it.
A data carving program is based on a simple concept.
When we data carve, we search three primary areas for
files: unallocated clusters, volume slack, and unused disk
space. We export these areas to disk and allow the carving
program to go to work. The carving program will search
these areas for file signatures that it knows and “carve” a
file out of that area. It will stop carving when it either
gets EOF information or until its upper limit of file size
to carve is reached. It is an inexact science. Just a
random set of characters that match a known file signature
can be misconstrued by the program as the start of a file
and it will carve out pure junk. This leads to a lot of
incomplete carvings and they will have a tendency to fill a
hard drive rather quickly. A carve of a 4GB drive's
freespace has been known to produce over 100GB of worthless
junk before the program crashed. Therefore, when carving,
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it is advantageous to constantly monitor the incomplete
carves for partial information. If no such information is
found, it is best to delete the incomplete files before
they get out of hand.
The tool we will use to do our data carving is the
DataLifter® File Extractor Pro. We will use the previously
used EnCase to extract our disk areas to carve.
Methodology:
1. Start EnCase and create a new case as outlined in Lab
A(ii).
2. The Lab Assistant has provided you with an EnCase
image called LabDi.E01. Drag and drop this image file
into your case. Allow EnCase to verify the image
before you continue.
3. Click on the pentagon symbol in the left-hand column
next to the icon of a hard drive. This expands the
drive image to show all files.
4. After you scroll all the way to the bottom, you will
notice three file names: Volume Slack, Unallocated
Clusters, and Unused Disk Area. These are the three
areas we want to carve. Check the boxes next to these
three files.
5. Click Edit --> Copy/UnErase.
6. Make sure the choices “All Selected Files” and
“Separate Files” have been selected (by their radio
buttons) and click Next.
7. In the Copy column, choose “Entire Physical File” and
make sure the Character Mask remains “None.” Click
Next.
8. Choose the location on disk (your group folder
F.R.E.D.'s auxiliary drive) where you wish to export
these to and set “Split Files Above” to 4000 (it is
easier to type this in than to use the arrow buttons).
Click Finish. This process takes about one and a half
minutes.
9. SUCCESS! You have now exported the files we want to
data carve. You will need EnCase to answer the bonus
question.
10.Start File Extractor Pro by double-clicking the icon
on the desktop.
11.If FEPro throws up an error stating there is no disk
in the drive, just continue to click “Continue” until
it finally starts the program.
12.We now want to tell FEPro which types of files we want
to carve. We start in the left-hand column, “Common
Headers.” Make sure to choose all image files and
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Internet files by clicking the pentagons next to the
appropriate datatype headers.
13.In the center section, “Custom Headers”, choose the
ones that are image and Internet related (roughly 25
more signatures) by checking the boxes next to them.
For this lab we are only concerned with images and
Internet files.
14.Now click the Start button (blue triangle). It may
continue to throw an error at you but just continue
clicking “Continue.” You should now see the File
Selection Wizard.
15.It is easier to carve one file at a time, so select “A
Single File” and click Next.
16.In this new screen, we will select the file we wish to
carve. Point FEPro to the Unallocated Clusters file
on disk that you carved. Click Next.
17.On this new screen, you will need to choose a location
to store what you have carved. Point it to a location
in your group's folder on F.R.E.D.'s auxiliary drive.
HINT: Make sure your location has a trailing
backslash ( \ ) at the end or FEPro won't put your
carved files in the proper location. This is a
feature, not a bug ;) . Click Next.
18.FEPro will present you with a warning. Click Continue
to start the carving process. Make sure you monitor
the output for the incomplete files to get out of
hand. Delete all unnecessary files.
19.When finished, it will display a small report and
throw more of the same error. This is fine.
20.SUCCESS! You have successfully raised files from the
dead. Now, answer the following questions:
Questions:
1. What is the main theme of the user's Internet surfing
and image collection?
2. BONUS QUESTION: NO POINTS INVOLVED, JUST BRAGGING
RIGHTS. What operating system (exact version) is the
image you imported into EnCase?

Answers:
1. Marijuana
2. Windows 2000 (FAT File System + WINNT folder = Win2K
FAT + Windows folder = WinXP or Win9x)
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Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Provide the students with a copy of the LabDiImage.E01
file for their usage.
● Grade students submissions and submit grades to
professor.
NTFS Alternate Data Streams
Purpose:
To acquaint students with locating NTFS Alternate Data
Streams.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Know what Alternate Data Streams are in NTFS
● Detect NTFS Alternate Data Streams
Key Concepts:
● NTFS Alternate Data Stream Detection
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● Floppy Disk (DSHD) from Project A(ii)
Introduction:
A very sneaky way that people can hide information in a
Windows system that uses the NTFS file system is by using
alternate data streams. ADS allows someone to implant
information, whether maliciously or not, into a file that
cannot be detected by normal means. These additions do not
alter the properties of the file that is acting as the
"carrier" of these streams. Neither the size nor the
display of the file is modified. The information
concerning the stream is stored in the $MFT and its mirror
which cannot be read while the computer is up and running.
Why and when did Microsoft allow this ability in NTFS?
Ever since NTFS has been available, the feature of ADS has
been integrated into the filesystem. Microsoft did this to
allow for compatibility between NTFS and the Macintosh
Hierarchical File System (HFS) [Zadjmool]. The modern
incarnations of Microsoft's NT family products use ADS as a
way to legitimately store information concerning files on
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the system.
How can we protect against malicious usage of ADS? There
is not really much of a proactive approach we can take in
this manner. Streams can be easily created at a command
prompt in Windows. We must be reactive in nature. We can
find ADS using two basic methods. The first is much
longer. If you copy the entire contents of a NTFS-based
hard drive onto another hard drive that has been formatted
with a variant of FAT, Microsoft will display a dialog box
every time it encounters the copying of a stream. At this
point, you can choose to have the stream saved into a
separate, visible file for later viewing or you can destroy
the stream. The second method is to use a tool
specifically designed to look for ADS and identify them.
This is the method we will pursue.
Methodology:
General Methodology Prior to Using Tools:
1. Create a duplicate of the Source Hard Drive (SHD)
using the Quick and Dirty Method from the previous
project. See Project A(ii) for methodology. The only
difference is we want to use the three machines with
removable drive bays instead of the tear-down machine.
Remove SHD and put it back where it belongs.
2. MAKE SURE F.R.E.D. IS POWERED OFF FOR THIS STEP!
Insert THD into an empty drive case and insert into
SCSI Block drive bay.
3. Power on F.R.E.D.
Directions for Using CrucialADS:
1. Download CrucialADS from
http://www.crucialsecurity.com/products/index.html
2. Unpack the downloaded zip file.
3. Find where you unpacked the zip file to and enter that
folder.
4. Double-click on the CrucialADS.exe file.
5. Select the drive that is representative of your THD.
6. Press Start.
7. When finished, record all found ADS and place the
results in your lab report.
8. SUCCESS!
Directions for Using LADS:
1. Download LADS from http://www.heysoft.de/nt/lads.zip
2. Unpack the downloaded zip file directly to the C:
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drive (this makes it much easier).
3. Open a command prompt.
4. Type cd \ at the prompt to make sure you are in the
right location.
5. Type lads.exe /s /v <THD Drive Letter> to start lads.
If you add > lads.txt it will record all the results
for you. Example: lads.exe /s /v c: > lads.txt
6. When finished, record all found ADS and place the
results in your lab report.
7. SUCCESS!
Answers:
The students should find at least two ADS on the target
system. I believe the exact number should be three, though.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Restore the dd image LabDImage.1 to a hard drive
preferably 4GB in size but you may substitute one that
is larger. Please make sure it has been forensically
sanitized in advance of restoring the image.
● Grade students submissions and submit grades to
professor.
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Final Lab Practical
THE SVENSYLVANIA HOOLIGAN BOMBING PLOT

The tiny island nation of Svensylvania is located in
the Gulf of Bothnia between Sweden and Finland. After many
disputes with the government of King Sven LXXIII, the
Svensylvanians declared their independence from Sweden in
1922. It is a peaceful country, except when soccer is
involved. The Svensylvanian hooligans are well-known
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within European football circles as the fiercest, rowdiest,
ugliest, and smelliest of them all.
Svensylvania has never been known as a major
footballing power. In fact, until qualifying rounds for
World Cup 2006, they had won only one international match.
They defeated Germany 1-0 in their only prior meeting in
1928. Yet, for this World Cup they assembled the finest
team ever seen on their shores. They dispatched the Faroe
Islands, Malta, and Liechtenstein in short order. Their
only loss was to World Cup 2006 hosts Germany. All
Svensylvania needed was a victory over Cyprus by two clear
goals and a win by Germany over the Faroe Islands to
achieve their hearts' desires. Svensylvania easily
defeated Cyprus 3-0 and awaited results from Munich. Alas,
the Germans were still bitter from their 1928 defeat to the
Svennies and threw their match. They lost shockingly 5-1
to the Faroe Islands in which eight German players
collapsed from heat exhaustion in the blazing hot 60 degree
temperature. This win by the Faroe Islands allowed them to
steal qualification on goal differential from Svensylvania.
An utter travesty had occurred.
The results outraged the entire Svensylvanian
population. Sven Karlssen of the Svensylvanians of Viking
Ancestry Thugs (S.O.V.A.T.), the largest organized hooligan
society in the country, released a communique hinting at a
“dynamite” half-time show during the final in Berlin.
Interpol has since been granted arrest warrants for all
members of S.O.V.A.T. that leave the tiny island nation.
After an anonymous tip traced to Canada, the arrest of a
suspected leader of S.O.V.A.T. was recently effected in
Vilnius, Lithuania. Inside his so-called “safe house”,
Interpol seized many of his personal items including his
computer.
The computer's hard drive has been entrusted to you,
one of the world's foremost computer forensic analysts.
You need to determine whether or not the rumors of a World
Cup bombing plot are true. If the rumors are false, this
man will merely be deported back to Svensylvania. If the
rumors are true, Interpol may be able to round up all
involved in this heinous plot and save the lives of 80,000
innocent World Cup final spectators.

METHODOLOGIES: The skills learned in the previous labs
will now culminate in this project.
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TOOLS:

All available tools at your disposal may be used.

Solutions to Lab:
Even though there may not appear to be much information on
the hard drive, there is in fact much to find. Obvious
information found will be pictures of Berlin's Olympic
Stadium, a map with Svensylvania on it, and a picture of
the Svensylvania flag. This is not incriminating evidence.
But, combining this with the alternate data stream
containing files explaining how to blow up the stadium, a
file listing S.O.V.A.T. members and their worldwide
locations, and the following data-carved items:
● Videos and documents relating to explosives
● A video communique' revealing the “dynamite” half-time
show
There should be sufficient circumstantial evidence of the
plot and Interpol can round up all members of S.O.V.A.T.

Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Restore the dd image LabEImage.1 to a hard drive
preferably 4GB in size but you may substitute one that
is larger. Please make sure it has been forensically
sanitized in advance of restoring the image.
● Grade students' submissions and submit grades to
professor. Students must print contents of both
alternate data stream files, list the files concerning
the explosives, and correctly identify the name of the
hooligan from the communique' video. Partial credit
is at the discretion of the grader.
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APPENDIX B:

Glossary of Terms

adware: Any software package which automatically plays,
displays, or downloads advertising material to a computer
after the software is installed on it or while the
application is being used. [Wiki]
alternate data streams: 1. Additional data associated
with a file system object that is not readily seen or
easily accessed. Commonly found in NTFS. Also known as
forks in UNIX. 2. Newer area where nefarious users can
hide data. Similar to steganography in intention.
bit-stream duplicate: 1. A sequential copying of all of
the bits on the media. [USDEA] 2. Transferring all
information bit-by-bit from one hard drive to another
without changing the information on the source drive. 3.
A clone of a hard drive.
black-hat hacker: Someone who breaks into a computer
system to deface, destroy, or steal information. May
intend to use compromised system to launch attacks on other
systems.
blue box: An early phreaking tool, the blue box is an
electronic device that simulates a telephone operator's
dialing console. It functions by replicating the tones used
to switch long-distance calls and using them to route the
user's own call, bypassing the normal switching mechanism.
[Wiki]
buffer overflow: A programming error which may result in a
memory access exception and program termination, or in the
event of the user being malicious, a breach of system
security. [Wiki]
chain of custody: The order in which a piece of criminal
evidence should be handled by persons investigating a case,
specif. the unbroken trail of accountability that ensures
the physical security of samples, data, and records in a
criminal investigation. [Webster's New Millennium™
Dictionary of English]

121

cyberharassment: In Internet parlance, annoyance above and
beyond what is considered tolerable. Usually involves
emails harassing a victim.
cybersquatting: The practice of buying Internet domain
names belonging to companies or famous people and then
trying to sell them to said organizations for an
unbelievable mark-up in price or just not allowing
ownership of them by whom should have ownership rights.
cyberstalking: The use of the Internet or other electronic
means to stalk someone which may be a computer crime or
harassment. [Wiki]
computer forensics: The science of acquiring, retrieving,
preserving, and presenting data that has been processed
electronically and stored on computer media. [Schweitzer,
2]
data carving: A process that uses a set of file headers
and footers to search for data that meets the specified
search pattern parameters. The term implies that
information is “carved” out of the media being searched
(implying it is somehow removed). [USDEA]
data destruction: The willful overwriting of data stored
in a medium with other data, usually just random values. A
technique used by people wishing to cover their tracks
after committing computer or computer-based crimes.
file header rectification: The technique of searching a
file forensically by its file headers to determine the
actual data type of the file. The file is then changed to
its appropriate data type in the file system. In Windows,
this rectification is done by changing a file's three
character extension.
forensic image:
An image is similar to a bit-stream
duplicate in that it copies all bits from the source drive
but differs in how it stores this information. The imaging
process creates a file (or multiple files) containing this
information as opposed cloning a hard drive.
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forensic sanitizing: A process that involves the
overwriting of existing data storage locations (containing
data) with a new pattern of zeros and ones. Wipe software
technology often wipes each storage location multiple times
to ensure that none of the original data remains. [USDEA]
gray-hat hacker: A hacker who breaks into systems
initially with only the intention to inform the owner of
security holes but then crosses the line into black-hat
hacking.
honeypot: A trap set to detect, deflect or in some manner
counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information
systems. Generally it consists of a computer, data or a
network site that appears to be part of a network but which
is actually isolated and protected, and which seems to
contain information or a resource that would be of value to
attackers. [Wiki]
intellectual property: An umbrella term for various legal
entitlements which attach to certain types of information,
ideas, or other intangibles in their expressed form. The
holder of this legal entitlement is generally entitled to
exercise various exclusive rights in relation to the
subject matter of the IP. The term intellectual property
reflects the idea that this subject matter is the product
of the mind or the intellect, and that IP rights may be
protected at law in the same way as any other form of
property. [Wiki]
image processing: 1. In computer forensics, determining
if an image (e.g. digital photograph) contains steganized
information. 2. Determining if an image has been altered
from its original.
imaging:

The process of creating a forensic image.

keylogger: A diagnostic used in software development that
captures the user's keystrokes. It can be useful to
determine sources of error in computer systems. Such
systems are also highly useful for law enforcement and
espionage—for instance, providing a means to obtain
passwords or encryption keys and thus bypassing other
security measures. [Wiki] Can also be hardware-based.
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keyword searching: In a computer forensics examination,
creating a list of terms and searching files or target
media for these terms.
malware: A generic term encompassing adware, keyloggers,
spyware, Trojan horses, viruses, worms, and other nefarious
pieces of software.
phishing: A form of criminal activity using social
engineering techniques. It is characterized by attempts to
fraudulently acquire sensitive information, such as
passwords and credit card details, by masquerading as a
trustworthy person or business in an apparently official
electronic communication. [Wiki]
phreaker (phreak):

One who engages in phreaking.

phreaking: A slang term coined to describe the activity of
a subculture of people who study, experiment with, or
exploit telephones, the telephone company, and systems
connected to or composing the Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) for the purposes of hobby or utility.
[Wiki]
salami slicing technique: The illegal practice of stealing
money repeatedly in extremely small quantities, usually by
taking advantage of rounding to the nearest cent (or other
monetary unit) in financial transactions. [Wiki]
social engineering: The practice of obtaining confidential
information by manipulation of legitimate users. A social
engineer will commonly use the telephone or Internet to
trick people into revealing sensitive information or
getting them to do something that is against typical
policies. [Wiki]
spam:

Unwanted email, usually in large volumes.

spyware: A broad category of malicious software designed
to intercept or take partial control of a computer's
operation without the informed consent of that machine's
owner or legitimate user. [Wiki]
steganography: The art and science of writing hidden
messages in such a way that no one apart from the intended
recipient knows of the existence of the message. [Wiki]
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Trojan horse: A malicious program that is disguised as or
embedded within legitimate software. The term is derived
from the classical myth of the Trojan Horse. They may look
useful or interesting (or at the very least harmless) to an
unsuspecting user, but are actually harmful when executed.
[Wiki]
virus: A self-replicating computer program that spreads by
inserting copies of itself into other executable code or
documents. [Wiki]
white-hat hacker: A hacker who breaks into systems with
only the intention to inform the owner of security holes.
wiping:

See forensic sanitizing

worm: A self-replicating computer program similar to a
computer virus. A virus attaches itself to, and becomes
part of, another executable program; however, a worm is
self-contained and does not need to be part of another
program to propagate itself. [Wiki]
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APPENDIX C:

Laboratory Curricula of Less Merit

Microsoft FAT-Based Systems
This lab was originally planned to introduce the students
to the FAT filesystem.

I initially believed it was

important to include it in the main body of the thesis for
the students to address during the term of a course.

What

led to this belief was my many conversations with people
who currently work as support technicians for many Internet
Service Providers (ISPs).

These technicians informed me

that many people still use Windows 9x family products and
still need help configuring the systems for Internet usage.
Because of the number of people still using these products
and the people I have met who have upgraded from Windows 9x
to Windows 2000/XP, I determined that it would be important
to include a teaching/learning section dealing with FAT.
Why I chose to remove this lab from the list of labs is
that it would be so highly specific (pertaining only to
FAT) as to distract from the broader topics that were more
important to cover.

This lab would be a better fit in an

intermediate to advanced level forensics course.

Since I

was asked by my thesis advisor to only detail labs to be
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used in a basic forensics course, the development of this
lab was put on hold.

A rough outline of the lab assignment

is as follows:
●
●

●

●

Introduction to FAT
Generations of FAT
■ FAT12
■ FAT16
■ FAT32
FAT Structure
■ FAT Boot Record
■ Root Directory
■ Data Area
■ Primary and Secondary FAT
■ Cluster Allocation
■ Difference Between FAT16 and FAT32 Allocation
FAT Exercises
■ What an Empty FAT Looks Like
■ How Files are Saved and Recorded Into the FAT
● Slack Space and Unallocated Space
■ File Deletion and Fragmentation
■ File Content Changes and How It Affects the FAT
■ How Easy It Is to Alter a FAT Entry

Windows NTFS-Based Systems
This lab was originally planned to introduce the students
to the NTFS filesystem.

I initially believed it was

important to include it in the main body of the thesis for
the students to address during the term of a course.

Every

Microsoft operating system released to the general public
since 2000 (with the exception of Windows Me) uses NTFS as
its default filesystem with FAT remaining an option.
Microsoft no longer supports the Windows 9x family of

Since

products, if users want to remain relatively secure in
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their computing by receiving patches and security updates
they will need to upgrade to Windows 2000/XP or the
forthcoming Windows Vista.

Thus, it is important to cover

the predominant filesystem used in the computing world.
Why I chose to remove this lab from the list of labs is
that it would be so highly specific (pertaining only to
NTFS) as to distract from the broader topics that were more
important to cover.

I did realize, though, that the

alternate data streams found in NTFS were an important
enough topic to merit space in the accepted laboratory
praxis section.

This lab, as outlined, would be a better

fit in an intermediate to advanced level forensics course.
Since I was asked by my thesis advisor to only detail labs
to be used in a basic forensics course, the development of
this lab was put on hold.

The structure of the lab would

have appeared similar to this:
●
●

●

Introduction to NTFS
Generations of NTFS
■ v1.0
■ v1.1
■ v1.2
■ v3.0
■ v3.1
NTFS Structure
■ NTFS Metadata Files
● $MFT
● $MFTMirr
● $LogFile
● $Volume
● $AttrDef
● . <The Root Directory>
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$Bitmap
$Boot
● $BadClus
● $Secure
● $UpCase
● $Extend
● Extension File Records
● $ObjID
● $Reparse
● $Quota
● $UsnJrnl
Similarities Between FAT and NTFS
NTFS Attributes
● 0x10
STANDARD_INFORMATION
● 0x20
ATTRIBUTE_LIST
● 0x30
FILE_NAME
● 0x40
$OBJECT_ID
● 0x50
$SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR
● 0x60
$VOLUME_NAME
● 0x70
$VOLUME_INFORMATION
● 0x80
$DATA
● 0x90
$INDEX_ROOT
● 0xA0
$INDEX_ALLOCATION
● 0xB0
$BITMAP
● 0xC0
$REPARSE_POINT
● 0xD0
$EA_INFORMATION
● 0xE0
$EA
● 0x100 $LOGGED_UTILITY_STREAM
DUDS (Default Unnamed Data Streams)
Alternate Data Streams
●
●

■
■

■
■
●

Exercises
■ Virtually Creating NTFS File Entries Into $MFT
■ Virtually Creating NTFS Alternate Data Streams in
the $MFT
■ Deleting Files and How It Affects the $MFT

UNIX/Linux Forensics
This lab was originally planned to introduce the students
to the UNIX/Linux forensics.

I initially believed it was

important to include it in the main body of the thesis for
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the students to address during the term of a course.

Linux

is a popular alternative to Microsoft Windows and is a
free/open-source implementation of the UNIX operating
system.

UNIX/Linux can be commonly found installed on

computers at universities, government research
laboratories, and increasingly on home computers.

Its

popularity extends from its speed and stability benefits
over Microsoft products with the ability to create or
modify Linux software.

It is believed that most web

servers worldwide reside on UNIX/Linux systems.

The main

disadvantage is its complexity in installing, using, and
maintenance in comparison to Microsoft products.

Why I

chose to remove this lab from the list of labs is that the
majority of forensic analyses performed will be on
computers with a Microsoft operating system.

Even though

knowledge of UNIX/Linux forensics is very important, it
would generally be considered outside the scope of this
thesis.

Therefore, it has been relegated to Appendix B.

This is an outline of what would have been developed:

●

●

History of UNIX
■ 1969 – The Beginning
■ 1974 – The Great Rewrite
■ AT&T and BSD – The Great Split
■ Here Comes the Sun
History of Linux
■ Richard Stallman and the Free Software Foundation
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The GNU Hurd
1991 – The Linux Torvalds Kernel
■ The Open Source Revolution
Common UNIX/Linux Filesystems
■ ext2/ext3
■ FFS
■ JFS
■ ReiserFS
■ UFS/UFS2
■ XFS
■ ZFS
■ Comparing/Contrasting the Filesystems
Major Filesystem Components
■ Inodes
■ Superblock
■ Datablock
■ Bootblock
■ Journaling
Common UNIX/Linux Exploits
■ Rootkits
■ Trojanized Binaries
■ Server Attacks
● Apache
● BIND
● Samba
● sendmail
■ Service Attacks
● OpenSSH
● telnet
Exercises -> Never Developed
■
■

●

●

●

●
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